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Historical perspective and better regulatory governance: An agenda for institutional reform

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  • Edward J. Balleisen
  • Elizabeth K. Brake

Abstract

Compared to economics, sociology, political science, and law, the discipline of history has had a limited role in the wide‐ranging efforts to reconsider strategies of regulatory governance, especially inside regulatory institutions. This article explores how more sustained historical perspective might improve regulatory decisionmaking. We first survey how a set of American regulatory agencies currently rely on historical research and analysis, whether for the purposes of public relations or as a means of supporting policymaking. We then consider how regulatory agencies might draw on history more self‐consciously, more strategically, and to greater effect. Three areas stand out in this regard – the use of history to improve understanding of institutional culture; reliance on historical analysis to test the empirical plausibility of conceptual models that make assumptions about the likelihood of potential economic outcomes; and integration of historical research methods into program and policy evaluation.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Balleisen & Elizabeth K. Brake, 2014. "Historical perspective and better regulatory governance: An agenda for institutional reform," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 222-245, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:8:y:2014:i:2:p:222-245
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Perri 6 & Eva Heims & Martha Prevezer, 2023. "How did international economic regulation survive the last period of deglobalization?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 272-289, January.

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