IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/reggov/v10y2016i3p211-229.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Formal independence of regulatory agencies and Varieties of Capitalism: A case of institutional complementarity?

Author

Listed:
  • Igor Guardiancich
  • Mattia Guidi

Abstract

The Varieties of Capitalism literature posits that national economic institutions reflect the mode of coordination of a country's market actors. Despite the importance of this claim and a rich literature on the emergence of regulatory capitalism, few studies test such prediction for Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). This article connects the two fields of research by analysing the impact of economic coordination on the formal independence of IRAs. The results show that, beyond issues of credible commitment and policy stability, the collective action capacity of market actors matters. In particular, regulators in Coordinated Market Economies enjoy less independence than in Liberal Market Economies, while intermediate regimes grant IRAs the least autonomy. The policy implications are nontrivial. Similar to other macroeconomic institutions, inappropriate combinations of economic coordination and IRA independence may engender Pareto‐suboptimal regulatory solutions. In such cases, policymakers should reconsider the rules governing national regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Igor Guardiancich & Mattia Guidi, 2016. "Formal independence of regulatory agencies and Varieties of Capitalism: A case of institutional complementarity?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(3), pages 211-229, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:3:p:211-229
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12080
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12080
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/rego.12080?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bartle, Ian, 2002. "When Institutions No Longer Matter: Reform of Telecommunications and Electricity in Germany, France and Britain," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 1-27, January.
    2. Iversen, Torben & Soskice, David, 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 165-181, May.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    4. Ebbinghaus, Bernhard (ed.), 2011. "The Varieties of Pension Governance: Pension Privatization in Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199586028, Decembrie.
    5. Fabrizio Gilardi, 2008. "Delegation in the Regulatory State," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12818.
    6. ELGIE, ROBERT & McMENAMIN, IAIN, 2005. "Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainty or Policy Complexity? Explaining Variations in the Independence of Non-majoritarian Institutions in France," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 531-548, July.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    8. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2003. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(3), pages 407-423, August.
    9. Hall, Peter A. & Gingerich, Daniel W., 2009. "Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 449-482, July.
    10. World Bank, 2014. "World Development Indicators 2014," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 18237, December.
    11. World Bank, 2013. "World Development Indicators 2013," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13191, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Reini Schrama, 2023. "Expert network interaction in the European Medicines Agency," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 491-511, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chris Hanretty & Christel Koop, 2013. "Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 195-214, June.
    2. Mattia Guidi, 2015. "The Impact of Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU Competition Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(6), pages 1195-1213, November.
    3. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847, Decembrie.
    4. Andrés Pavón Mediano, 2020. "Agencies’ formal independence and credible commitment in the Latin American regulatory state: A comparative analysis of 8 countries and 13 sectors," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(1), pages 102-120, January.
    5. Manuela Moschella & Luca Pinto, 2022. "The multi‐agencies dilemma of delegation: Why do policymakers choose one or multiple agencies for financial regulation?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1250-1264, October.
    6. Laurenz Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2016. "Do parties matter in delegation? Partisan preferences and the creation of regulatory agencies in Europe," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(3), pages 193-210, September.
    7. Jan Fagerberg & Martin Srholec, 2017. "Global Dynamics, Capabilities and the Crisis," Economic Complexity and Evolution, in: Andreas Pyka & Uwe Cantner (ed.), Foundations of Economic Change, pages 83-106, Springer.
    8. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    9. Sam R. Bell & K. Chad Clay & Amanda Murdie, 2019. "Join the Chorus, Avoid the Spotlight: The Effect of Neighborhood and Social Dynamics on Human Rights Organization Shaming," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 167-193, January.
    10. Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 739-770, September.
    11. Daniel Krcmaric, 2018. "Varieties of civil war and mass killing," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(1), pages 18-31, January.
    12. Jamus Jerome Lim, 2021. "The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 309-335, March.
    13. Boschma, Ron & Capone, Gianluca, 2015. "Institutions and diversification: Related versus unrelated diversification in a varieties of capitalism framework," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1902-1914.
    14. John D. Burger & Francis E. Warnock, 2006. "Local Currency Bond Markets," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(si), pages 1-7.
    15. Simplice Asongu & Uduak S. Akpan & Salisu R. Isihak, 2018. "Determinants of foreign direct investment in fast-growing economies: evidence from the BRICS and MINT countries," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, December.
    16. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(4), pages 751-777, December.
    17. Asongu, Simplice & Nwachukwu, Jacinta, 2015. "Drivers of FDI in Fast Growing Developing Countries: Evidence from Bundling and Unbundling Governance," MPRA Paper 67294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, September.
    19. Kern, Andreas & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2019. "IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 212-229.
    20. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:3:p:211-229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1748-5991 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.