IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/navres/v63y2016i5p386-400.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nonlinear pricing with consumer satiation

Author

Listed:
  • Hui Xiong
  • Ying‐Ju Chen

Abstract

In various scenarios, consumers may become satiated with products, and the degree of satiation is directly associated with their prior experiences. Confronted with consumer satiation, the seller is unable to either identify consumers who have a higher likelihood of being satiated ex ante or distinguish satiated from non‐satiated consumers ex post. Therefore, the seller should address dynamic selling, valuation uncertainty, and quantity decisions, all of which are important operational issues. We consider a two‐period problem in which consumer types are influenced by their prior consumption experiences. Faced with these consumers, the seller intends to optimize quantities and adjust the prices of the products in each period to maximize revenue. We find that the seller may reduce ex ante production quantity as some consumers become satiated. Moreover, the ex ante quantity is first decreasing and then increasing with regard to the satiation rate. Furthermore, two‐period information asymmetries may provide a rationale for upward distortion in quantity when consumer preferences are highly sensitive to first‐period consumption. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 386–400, 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Hui Xiong & Ying‐Ju Chen, 2016. "Nonlinear pricing with consumer satiation," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(5), pages 386-400, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:63:y:2016:i:5:p:386-400
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.21696
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21696
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/nav.21696?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:bla:kyklos:v:45:y:1992:i:3:p:327-45 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Péter Eső & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
    3. Manel Baucells & Rakesh K. Sarin, 2007. "Satiation in Discounted Utility," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 170-181, February.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1992. "Habits, Addictions, and Traditions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 327-345, August.
    5. Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "A Theory of Rational Addiction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 675-700, August.
    6. Manel Baucells & Rakesh K. Sarin, 2010. "Predicting Utility Under Satiation and Habit Formation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(2), pages 286-301, February.
    7. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    8. Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2014. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 601-653, March.
    9. Zhuoxin Li & Stephen M. Gilbert & Guoming Lai, 2015. "Supplier Encroachment as an Enhancement or a Hindrance to Nonlinear Pricing," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(1), pages 89-109, January.
    10. Hui Xiong & Ying-Ju Chen, 2014. "Product Line Design with Seller-Induced Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(3), pages 784-795, March.
    11. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    12. Daniel Adelman & Adam J. Mersereau, 2013. "Dynamic Capacity Allocation to Customers Who Remember Past Service," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 592-612, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wei Zhang & Long Gao & Mohammad Zolghadr & Dawei Jian & Mohsen ElHafsi, 2023. "Dynamic incentives for sustainable contract farming," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(7), pages 2049-2067, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Monopolistic screening under learning by doing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 574-597, September.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:6:p:1324-1369 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Morhaim, Lisa & Ulus, Ayşegül Yıldız, 2023. "On history-dependent optimization models: A unified framework to analyze models with habits, satiation and optimal growth," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    6. Sudeep Bhatia & Graham Loomes & Daniel Read, 2021. "Establishing the laws of preferential choice behavior," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(6), pages 1324-1369, November.
    7. Frank Yang, 2021. "Costly Multidimensional Screening," Papers 2109.00487, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    8. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    9. Manel Baucells & Lin Zhao, 2020. "Everything in Moderation: Foundations and Applications of the Satiation Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5701-5719, December.
    10. Aparupa Das Gupta & Uday S. Karmarkar & Guillaume Roels, 2016. "The Design of Experiential Services with Acclimation and Memory Decay: Optimal Sequence and Duration," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1278-1296, May.
    11. Junyi Chai, 2023. "A Behavioral Foundation of Satiation and Habituation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-18, January.
    12. Chai, Junyi, 2021. "A model of ambition, aspiration and happiness," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(2), pages 692-702.
    13. Meng, Dawen & Sun, Lei & Tian, Guoqiang, 2022. "Dynamic mechanism design on social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 84-120.
    14. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    15. Manel Baucells & Rakesh K. Sarin, 2013. "Determinants of Experienced Utility: Laws and Implications," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(2), pages 135-151, June.
    16. Jiao, Wen & Yan, Hong & Pang, King-Wah, 2016. "Nonlinear pricing for stochastic container leasing system," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-18.
    17. Ye, Lixin & Zhang, Chenglin, 2017. "Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    18. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(8), pages 2553-2595, August.
    19. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    20. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    21. Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2016. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 189-222, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:63:y:2016:i:5:p:386-400. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)1520-6750 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.