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Nonlinear pricing for stochastic container leasing system

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  • Jiao, Wen
  • Yan, Hong
  • Pang, King-Wah

Abstract

With the substantial upsurge of container traffic, the container leasing company thrives on the financial benefits and operational flexibility of leasing containers requested by shippers. In practice, container lease pricing problem is different from the consumer product pricing in consideration of the fair value of container, limited customer types and monopolistic supply market. In view of the durability of container and the diversified lease time and quantity, the pricing is a challenging task for the leasing company. This paper examines the monopolist’s nonlinear pricing problems in static and dynamic environments. In particular, the leasing company designs and commits a menu of price and hire quantity/time pairs to maximize the expected profit and in turn customers choose hire quantities/time to maximize their surpluses according to their hire preferences. In a static environment, closed-form solutions are obtained for different groups of customers with multiple types subject to capacity constraint. In a dynamic environment, we address two customer types and derive closed-form solutions for the problem of customers with hire time preference. Further, we show that the effect of the capacity constraint increases with time of the planning horizon when customers have the same hire time preference; while in the case with different hire time preferences, the capacity constraint has opposite effects on the low and high type customers. Last, the case of customers with hire quantity preference is discussed. We focus on the lease with alternative given sets of hire time and use dynamic programming to derive the numerical optimal hire time sequence.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiao, Wen & Yan, Hong & Pang, King-Wah, 2016. "Nonlinear pricing for stochastic container leasing system," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-18.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:89:y:2016:i:c:p:1-18
    DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2016.03.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Zheng, Jianfeng & Sun, Zhuo & Zhang, Fangjun, 2016. "Measuring the perceived container leasing prices in liner shipping network design with empty container repositioning," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 123-140.
    3. Wang, Mengyue & Huang, Hongxuan, 2019. "The design of a flexible capital-constrained global supply chain by integrating operational and financial strategies," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 40-62.
    4. Xufeng Yang & Juliang Zhang & Wen Jiao & Hong Yan, 2023. "Optimal Capacity Rationing Policy for a Container Leasing System with Multiple Kinds of Customers and Substitutable Containers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 1468-1485, March.
    5. Xufeng Yang & Wen Jiao & Juliang Zhang & Hong Yan, 2022. "Capacity management for a leasing system with different equipment and batch demands," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(7), pages 3004-3020, July.

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