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The autonomous flexible labor force

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  • Evan Barlow
  • Gad Allon
  • Achal Bassamboo

Abstract

Flexible human resources and lean business processes are integral components of many operations. In this paper, we present and analyze a model that explores the interaction between a worker's production autonomy and chosen breadth of training. This model helps explain why existing observations and the literature are mixed regarding whether lean initiatives accompany production autonomy. We also present empirically testable hypotheses that highlight interesting model insights. Finally, we use results from our model to argue that an efficient company attempting to become leaner by “doing more with less” is likely to lower the size of the workforce and lower production autonomy.

Suggested Citation

  • Evan Barlow & Gad Allon & Achal Bassamboo, 2021. "The autonomous flexible labor force," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 516-527, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:42:y:2021:i:2:p:516-527
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3251
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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