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Will American Needle Burst the NFL's Balloon?

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  • Roger D. Blair
  • Roger D. Blair
  • Wenche Wang

Abstract

For decades, the National Football League pooled their intellectual property and issued nonexclusive blanket licenses. No one complained. When the National Football League decided to award an exclusive license to Reebok for headwear production, one of the former licensees, American Needle, filed suit. In this paper, we analyze the competitive significance of exclusive licensing as well as joint marketing of trademark licenses. We suggest that the decision to issue an exclusive license has no anticompetitive potential. Pooling the thirty‐two clubs' trademarks, however, cast potential anticompetitive problems. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Blair & Roger D. Blair & Wenche Wang, 2017. "Will American Needle Burst the NFL's Balloon?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(5), pages 664-675, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:38:y:2017:i:5:p:664-675
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, 2014. "Restraints On Quality Competition," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 27-46.
    2. Stefan Szymanski, 2004. "Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(2), pages 111-126, May.
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