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Plural Forms of Organization: Where Do We Stand?

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  • Claude Ménard

Abstract

This paper addresses a puzzling problem: why do parties often choose to combine alternative modes of organizations simultaneously while dealing with identical or almost identical transactions? I propose a model to capture these so-called ‘plural forms' and to explain the choice of such non-standard arrangements. Three determinants are identified as playing the major role: ambiguity surrounding the fitness of a mode of organization to the transaction at stake; complexity of a transaction or a set of transactions; and strategic behavior. Propositions are derived that are confronted to empirical data coming out of the agrifood industry.
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  • Claude Ménard, 2013. "Plural Forms of Organization: Where Do We Stand?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(3-5), pages 124-139, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:34:y:2013:i:3-5:p:124-139
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    1. Dutta, Shantanu, et al, 1995. "Understanding Dual Distribution: The Case of Reps and House Accounts," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 189-204, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Achilleas Kontogeorgos & Panagiota Sergaki & Fotios Chatzitheodoridis, 2017. "An Assessment Of New Farmers’ Perceptions About Agricultural Cooperatives," Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship (JDE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 22(01), pages 1-13, March.
    2. Miranda, Bruno & Chaddad, Fabio, 2016. "Transaction Costs, Capabilities, and Grape Procurement Strategies in U.S. Emerging Wine Regions," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235363, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Maria Angela Perito & Marcello De Rosa & Luca Bartoli & Emilio Chiodo & Giuseppe Martino, 2017. "Heterogeneous Organizational Arrangements in Agrifood Chains: A Governance Value Analysis Perspective on the Sheep and Goat Meat Sector of Italy," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 7(6), pages 1-16, May.

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