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Social norms, coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams

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  • Marilyne Antonetti

    (Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France)

  • Alexandra Rufini

    (Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France)

Abstract

This paper considers the coordinating role of social norms in a heterogeneous team of workers. We define an optimal unit of production as a form of organisation involving several teams and members, with the following properties: (i) a social norm operating to coordinate individual efforts; (ii) a team with heterogeneous skills, enabling generation of synergies. Our model suggests that competences of the best worker are transferred to his or her peers. This collaborative process enhances team efficiency but only if there is an implicit ex ante coordinating device based on social norms that discourage free riding. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Marilyne Antonetti & Alexandra Rufini, 2008. "Social norms, coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(7), pages 547-554.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:547-554
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1417
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Schmidt, Martin B., 2021. "Risk and uncertainty in team building: Evidence from a professional basketball market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 735-753.
    2. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Enrique Fatas & Shi Qi, 2016. "Stand by Me—Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2916-2936, October.

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