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The politics of bureaucratic competition: The case of natural resource policy

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  • Todd Kunioka
  • Lawrence S. Rothenberg

Abstract

Many concerned with how government functions consider creating competition between bureaucracies an attractive option. Others are skeptical of what impact rival agencies have when they are operating within a political context. Reflecting these discrepant viewpoints, some scholars believe that regulators will compete vigorously for resources and responsibilities; others assert that agency members will act passively as they attempt to protect their autonomy. To assess these contrasting perspectives and determine why competitive agency structures might exist, the following analysis examines one of the classic situations where agencies can serve as functional substitutes: the relationship between the United States Forest Service and the National Park Service. The results demonstrate that agencies put far more weight on autonomy than competition. The principal advantage of functional rivalry for politicians-at least where federal lands are concerned-is to expand the choice set of alternatives available to them.

Suggested Citation

  • Todd Kunioka & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 1993. "The politics of bureaucratic competition: The case of natural resource policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 700-725.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:12:y:1993:i:4:p:700-725
    DOI: 10.2307/3325347
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul L. Joskow, 1972. "The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a Formal Regulatory Hearing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(2), pages 632-644, Autumn.
    2. Craig W. Allin, 1987. "PARK SERVICE v. FOREST SERVICE: EXPLORING THE DIFFERENCES IN WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 7(2), pages 385-394, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter K. Hazlett & Chandler S. Reilly, 2023. "Bureaucratic rent creation: the case of price discrimination in the market for postsecondary education," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 226-256, June.

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