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Learning from structural adjustment: why selectivity may not be the key to successful programmes in Africa

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  • Farhad Noorbakhsh

    (Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK)

  • Alberto Paloni

    (Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK)

Abstract

Many donors have come to view selectivity in aid allocation-particularly towards countries with good governance-as the key for improving aid effectiveness. This position draws support from research according to which the success of policy reforms depends exclusively on domestic political economy factors. This finding has recently been questioned, however. This paper makes an original contribution to the literature with its attempt to identify the determinants of compliance with World Bank conditionality by employing publicly available data which evaluate a country's compliance directly. Our analysis suggests that poor compliance is not exclusively determined by exogenous factors, which the World Bank cannot influence, but is also a consequence of poor policy design. Better design of reform programmes is essential for greater aid effectiveness. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Farhad Noorbakhsh & Alberto Paloni, 2007. "Learning from structural adjustment: why selectivity may not be the key to successful programmes in Africa," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(7), pages 927-948.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:19:y:2007:i:7:p:927-948
    DOI: 10.1002/jid.1357
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack & Nadia Molenaers, 2013. "Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 447-476, December.

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