The IMF After the Asian Crisis: Merits and Limitations of the ‘Long‐term Development Partner’ Role

We examine the view, espoused by a number of commentators in recent months, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should seek to withdraw from its long‐term lending operations, in the wake of the recent financial crisis in Asia and elsewhere, and restrict itself to its ‘core competency’ of preventing and where necessary lending into financial crisis. This view is based on a belief that such long‐term lending crowds out both private sector operations and short‐term IMF lending; and that it is ineffective, because of weaknesses in the IMF’s conditionality. Both of these propositions, we argue, can be challenged. In the poorer developing countries there is virtually no private sector to crowd out, and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) operations have been conspicuously successful, not only at promoting growth, but also at achieving structural changes not at all achieved by aid donors such as strengthening the tax base. Such changes inevitably require a longer time‐period than the standard three years of an IMF standby, not only in order to induce a production response but also in order to achieve the necessary measure of stabilisation and economic reform without imposing social pressures which wreck the production response. The latter argument is particularly powerful in middle income countries, and provides an argument for IMF support to these countries also whilst they are temporarily excluded from international capital markets. Often also a long‐term presence is needed to achieve effective leverage in short‐term operations. In such cases the IMF’s long‐term lending should be seen as preconditional to the success of, and not as an alternative to, its short‐term operations. We therefore argue for the retention of the Fund’s long‐term lending function; and for this function not to be transferred to the World Bank, which has less credibility in global financial markets and less comparative advantage in macro‐economic management. Measures are indeed needed to reduce the level of the IMF’s exposure to risk in poorer developing countries, but those, we believe, should consist of the preventive measures currently going on, and measures to increase the ratio of equity to debt, rather than measures which would jeopardise the progress in long‐term poverty alleviation capacity achieved by the Fund over recent years