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Law tradition and institutional quality: some empirical evidence

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  • Alberto Chong

    (The World Bank and Georgetown University Public Policy Institute, Washington DC, USA)

  • Luisa Zanforlin

    (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, USA)

Abstract

Law tradition of a country is associated with its institutional quality. Countries with a French Civil code tradition display a negative link with bureaucratic development, lack of corruption, credibility of governments and others. Results are maintained even after controlling for regional and colonial variables and, in general, appear robust. Countries with a Common Law tradition show a positive relationship with institutional quality, though not as robust when testing a broad range of specifications. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of Scully, Posner and others, that link origin of laws and economic behaviour. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong & Luisa Zanforlin, 2000. "Law tradition and institutional quality: some empirical evidence," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(8), pages 1057-1068.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:12:y:2000:i:8:p:1057-1068
    DOI: 10.1002/jid.681
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    References listed on IDEAS

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