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Do Lies Erode Trust?

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  • Glynis Gawn
  • Robert Innes

Abstract

Does honesty promote trust and trustworthiness? We investigate how being lied to (versus told the truth) in a Gneezy deception game affects behavior in a subsequent trust game with different players. Using a design that controls for potential treatment effects on payoffs, mood, and beliefs about the overall propensity for honesty in the experiment, we find that the specific experience of being lied to significantly erodes trust and trustworthiness.

Suggested Citation

  • Glynis Gawn & Robert Innes, 2018. "Do Lies Erode Trust?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(1), pages 137-161, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:1:p:137-161
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12265
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    Cited by:

    1. Radu, Vranceanu & Delphine, Dubart, 2019. "Experimental evidence on deceitful communication: does everyone have a price ?," ESSEC Working Papers WP1806, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    2. Vranceanu, Radu & Dubart, Delphine, 2019. "Deceitful communication in a sender-receiver experiment: Does everyone have a price?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 43-52.
    3. Dugar, Subhasish & Mitra, Arnab & Shahriar, Quazi, 2019. "Deception: The role of uncertain consequences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-18.
    4. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2018. "Language and lies," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 167-176.
    5. Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi, 2023. "Lying for votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 46-72.
    6. Chadi, Adrian & Homolka, Konstantin, 2022. "Little Lies and Blind Eyes – Experimental Evidence on Cheating and Task Performance in Work Groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 122-159.
    7. Robert Innes, 2017. "Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 107-131, October.
    8. Innes, Robert, 2022. "Does deception raise or lower lie aversion? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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