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The physician–patient relationship: the impact of patient‐obtained medical information

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  • Bin Xie
  • David M. Dilts
  • Mikhael Shor

Abstract

We investigate the impact of patient‐obtained medical information (POMI) on the physician–patient relationship when patients, as a group, are heterogeneously informed and a physician's interests do not coincide with those of her patients. Introducing additional well‐informed patients to the population discontinuously affects the physician's strategy, having no effect unless a sufficient quantity is added. When few patients are well informed, increasing the precision of their information level has no effect on the physician's strategy. Alternately, when a sufficient number of well‐informed patients exists, increasing the precision of their information allows all patients to free‐ride by receiving more appropriate treatment recommendations. Counterintuitively, we also identify circumstances under which increasing the general level of information may potentially harm patients. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • Bin Xie & David M. Dilts & Mikhael Shor, 2006. "The physician–patient relationship: the impact of patient‐obtained medical information," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(8), pages 813-833, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:15:y:2006:i:8:p:813-833
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.1098
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    2. Arrieta, Alejandro, 2007. "A Structural Misclassifcation Model to Estimate the Impact of Physician Incentives on Healthcare Utilization," MPRA Paper 6718, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2012. "The value of private information in the physician-patient relationship: a gametheoretic account," Working Papers 12-23, Utrecht School of Economics.
    4. Zonderland, Maartje E. & Timmer, Judith, 2012. "Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 219(3), pages 630-637.
    5. Christian Schmid, 2015. "Consumer Health Information and the Demand for Physician Visits," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(12), pages 1619-1631, December.
    6. Fang Hai & Miller Nolan H. & Rizzo John & Zeckhauser Richard, 2011. "Demanding Customers: Consumerist Patients and Quality of Care," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-51, September.
    7. Alex Barrachina & Víctor González-Chordá, 2016. "To report or not to report: Applying game theory to nursing error reporting," Working Papers 2016/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    8. Hiroaki Suenaga & Maria Rosalía Vicente, 2022. "Online and offline health information seeking and the demand for physician services," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 23(3), pages 337-356, April.

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