Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Bi‐Dimensional Courts: Evidence from Catalonia

The empirical literature has consistently shown that judicial ideal points can be estimated in a one‐dimensional space that reflects the traditional conservative‐progressive dichotomy. In this article, we develop an empirical methodology to analyze some features that may characterize bi‐dimensional courts when dissenting opinions are not frequent. We apply the analysis to the particular case of the Consell de Garanties Estatutàries de Catalunya (Catalan Constitutional Court). The results illustrate that judicial preferences on conservative‐progressive grounds are likely to affect the decision outcome of the Court on issues having significant public policy content. Conversely, judicial preferences regarding Spanish‐Catalan sovereignty tend to encroach on judgments concerning public policy, thus affecting the outcome of all judgments of the Court regardless of content type. Furthermore, we find that judicial preferences in the Spanish‐Catalan sovereignty dimension are pervasive enough to shift the outcome of all types of decisions in favor of Catalan institutions. Policy conclusions are derived.