On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms
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DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20240
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
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- Guanyi Wang, 2024. "Robust Network Targeting with Multiple Nash Equilibria," Papers 2410.20860, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
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