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Corrigendum to “Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set”

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  • Jonathan Newton

Abstract

Lemma 1 of Ray and Vohra (2019) is false as stated, but holds under alternative conditions which are consistent with the ideas of coalitional sovereignty that motivate the cited paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Newton, 2021. "Corrigendum to “Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set”," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 18-20, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:4:p:18-20
    DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18420
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Green, Jerry R, 1974. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-34, January.
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