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Marshall and Walras, disequilibrium trades and the dynamics of equilibration in the continuous double auction market

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  • Plott, Charles
  • Roy, Nilanjan
  • Tong, Baojia

Abstract

Prices and quantities converge to the theoretical competitive equilibria in continuous, double auction markets. The double auction is not a tatonnement mechanism. Disequilibrium trades take place. The absence of any influence of disequilibrium trades, which have the capacity to change the theoretical equilibrium, appears to be due to a property found in the Marshallian model of single market adjustments. The Marshallian model incorporates a principle of self-organizing, coordination that mysteriously determines the sequence in which specific pairs of agents trade in an environment in which market identities and agent preferences are not public. Disequilibrium trades along the Marshallian path of trades do not change the theoretical equilibrium. The substance of this paper is to demonstrate that the Marshallian principle captures a natural tendency of the adjustment in single, continuous, double auction markets and to suggest how it takes place. The Marshallian model of quantity adjustment and the Walrasian model of market price adjustment can be seen as companion theories that explain the allocation and price processes of a market. The Marshallian model explains the evolution of the allocation, who will meet and trade, and the Walrasian excess demand explains the evolution of prices when they do.

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  • Plott, Charles & Roy, Nilanjan & Tong, Baojia, 2013. "Marshall and Walras, disequilibrium trades and the dynamics of equilibration in the continuous double auction market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 190-205.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:94:y:2013:i:c:p:190-205
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2021. "Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 94-106.
    2. Itzhak Rasooly, 2022. "Competitive equilibrium and the double auction," Papers 2209.07532, arXiv.org.
    3. Katerina Sherstyuk & Krit Phankitnirundorn & Michael J. Roberts, 2021. "Randomized double auctions: gains from trade, trader roles, and price discovery," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1325-1364, December.
    4. Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," CESifo Working Paper Series 8820, CESifo.
    5. César Martinelli & Jianxin Wang & Weiwei Zheng, 2023. "Competition with indivisibilities and few traders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 78-106, March.
    6. Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2020. "Attainment of Equilibrium: Marshallian Path Adjustment and Buyer Determinism," MPRA Paper 104103, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Agranov Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers 273, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    8. Yariv, Leeat & Agranov, Marina & Dianat, Ahrash & Samuelson, Larry, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 15637, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Itzhak Rasooly, 2022. "Competitive equilibrium and the double auction," Economics Series Working Papers 974, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    10. Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers 2021-74, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    11. Olivier Baguelin, 2020. "What's right with the neoclassical legacy? Allais' response," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02541406, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market micro structure; Price discovery; Price dynamics; Market volume; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B10 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - General
    • B12 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory

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