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Technology market, product market and aggregate innovation

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  • Shiyun Xia

Abstract

This paper examines the growth maximization mix for intellectual property rights (IPR) in an economy in which incumbents and outside inventors endogenously choose how to develop inventions and commercialization strategies, both of which determine the innovation rate. Outside inventors can choose to commercialize their inventions by (i) launching a new product or (ii) selling to incumbents. I find that if inventors all sell on the technology market, then protecting inventors' patents from imitation by firms raises aggregate innovation. If, instead, all inventors enter the product market, the IPR policy that regulates the ability of incumbents' patents to block the entry of improved products faces a trade‐off between innovation from existing firms and inventors, which leads to a single‐peaked relationship between economic growth and the blocking strength. When both commercialization strategies are chosen, a balanced IPR policy can raise aggregate innovation by encouraging inventors to choose the more efficient commercialization method. Marché de la technologie, marché des produits et innovation agrégée. Cet article examine la combinaison de maximisation de la croissance pour les droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI) dans une économie où les titulaires et les inventeurs externes choisissent de manière endogène la façon de créer les inventions et les stratégies de commercialisation, qui déterminent toutes deux le taux d'innovation. Les inventeurs externes peuvent choisir de commercialiser leurs inventions en (i) lançant un nouveau produit ou en (ii) vendant aux titulaires. Je constate que si les inventeurs vendent tous sur le marché de la technologie, la protection des brevets des inventeurs contre l'imitation par les entreprises augmente l'innovation agrégée. Si, au contraire, tous les inventeurs entrent sur le marché des produits, la politique en matière de DPI qui réglemente la capacité des brevets des titulaires à bloquer l'entrée de produits améliorés se heurte à un compromis entre l'innovation des entreprises existantes et celle des inventeurs, ce qui mène à une relation à sommet unique entre la croissance économique et la force de blocage. Lorsque les deux stratégies de commercialisation sont choisies, une politique équilibrée en matière de DPI peut accroître l'innovation agrégée en encourageant les inventeurs à choisir la méthode de commercialisation la plus efficace.

Suggested Citation

  • Shiyun Xia, 2024. "Technology market, product market and aggregate innovation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(3), pages 901-932, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:57:y:2024:i:3:p:901-932
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12727
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    References listed on IDEAS

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