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Trade restrictiveness indexes and welfare: A structural approach

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  • Anson Soderbery

Abstract

Trade restrictiveness indexes (TRIs) have become a staple for practitioners and policy‐makers to summarize international trade barriers. TRIs theoretically found a measure of trade restrictiveness by calculating the uniform tariff that is welfare equivalent to the observed distribution of applied tariffs within a country. Here we incorporate importer market power and exporter heterogeneity into calculations of TRIs and welfare globally. To do so, we structurally estimate a quantitative model of international trade. The structure of the model allows tractable estimation of importer and exporter welfare and TRIs for every country in the world from 1990 to 2007. Canonical estimates, which ignore exporter heterogeneity and importer market power, are shown to overstate efficiency losses from tariffs by a factor of 5 for the average importer. Additionally, by not accounting for importer market power canonical methods fail to measure substantial welfare losses to exporters that are captured by importers through tariffs. These channels are shown to significantly impact the measurement and interpretation of TRIs. To conclude, we employ the methodology to evaluate China's WTO accession and a counterfactual renegotiation of NAFTA. Analyse des mutations en matière d’émissions de polluants : les entreprises qui partent et celles qui restent. Cet article analyse les rejets polluants des industries américaines afin de souligner l'importance relative de quatre sources de baisse d'intensité des émissions : l'entrée d'une entreprise moins polluante, la sortie d'une entreprise plus polluante, le redéploiement des activités parmi les entreprises encore en activité et l'ajustement de l'intensité des émissions au sein même d'une entreprise. Ensuite, en nous appuyant sur un échantillon de productions et de rejets de polluants atmosphériques et aquatiques au niveau des entreprises américaines, nous analysons l’évolution des émissions en trois sources traditionnellement représentées dans la littérature : les changements d’échelle (production), les changements de composition (part de marché de l'industrie) et les changements de techniques industrielles (intensité des émissions). Nous analysons enfin les changements liés à l'intensité des émissions au niveau des entreprises en quatre sources pour trois des principaux polluants atmosphériques et aquatiques. Pour ce qui est des émissions de composés organiques volatils, la réduction de presque deux‐tiers des émissions au niveau du secteur découle de la baisse d'intensité des émissions au sein même des entreprises. Le dernier tiers découle du redéploiement des activités vers des établissements plus propres. Bien que l'ampleur des résultats puisse varier, ces derniers demeurent à peu près semblables pour les particules en suspension et le dioxyde de soufre. Les rejets d'effluents dans l'eau au niveau des sites industriels affichent une tendance comparable, bien que l'importance relative du redéploiement soit supérieure. En outre, nous constatons que la réduction d’émissions de polluants aquatiques au sein des entreprises résulte de transferts accrus vers des installations publiques de traitement des eaux situées à l'extérieur des sites de production. La contribution hétérogène des différentes sources de baisse d'intensité des émissions de polluants indique que le « nettoyage » du secteur manufacturier américain est probablement dû à une multiplicité de facteurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Anson Soderbery, 2021. "Trade restrictiveness indexes and welfare: A structural approach," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 1018-1045, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:54:y:2021:i:3:p:1018-1045
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12525
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