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Optimal agenda‐setter timing

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  • Mattias K. Polborn
  • Gerald Willmann

Abstract

We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member. On analyse le timing optimal d'un maître de l'ordre du jour qui peut proposer un projet sur lequel un comité va alors se prononcer. Le gain a deux composantes : l'une commune et stochastique, et l'autre idiosyncratique et variable selon les membres du comité. Le maître de l'ordre du jour peut pencher en faveur ou contre le projet, par rapport au membre médian du comité, et il choisit le moment du vote. On analyse comment cette décision du moment du vote dépend de l'environnement politique et du biais du maître de l'ordre du jour. On montre que les maîtres de l'ordre du jour (en faveur ou contre le projet) peuvent engendrer des décisions qui diffèrent de celles préférées par le membre médian du comité.

Suggested Citation

  • Mattias K. Polborn & Gerald Willmann, 2009. "Optimal agenda‐setter timing," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(4), pages 1527-1546, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:42:y:2009:i:4:p:1527-1546
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01556.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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