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Political Conflict over Time

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  • William Howell
  • Stefan Krasa
  • Mattias Polborn

Abstract

We study a model of electoral competition in which politicians must decide whether to initiate the provision of some public good and, afterward, how much of the public good to supply. The model illuminates how a project's implementation affects elections and, conversely, how electoral considerations influence decisions about implementation. Under well‐defined conditions, politicians will either implement projects that they do not like or delay projects that, absent electoral concerns, they would support. The model further reveals how the perceived benefits of holding office can impede the production of public goods about which there is broad consensus. And depending on facts about the program's structure and the electoral landscape, a policy's implementation can either mitigate or exacerbate political conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • William Howell & Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2020. "Political Conflict over Time," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(3), pages 554-568, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:64:y:2020:i:3:p:554-568
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12467
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Loeper, Antoine & Dziuda, Wioletta, 2024. "Voters and the trade-off between policy stability and responsiveness," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).

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