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Dynamic Policymaking with Decay

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  • Steven Callander
  • Gregory J. Martin

Abstract

It is often said that the only constant is change itself. As time passes, the population grows, new technologies are invented, and the skills, demographics, and norms of the populace evolve. These changes, whether in isolation or in aggregate, influence the effectiveness of policy. In particular, policies designed for today's world are unlikely to provide a perfect fit tomorrow. We develop a notion of policy decay that captures this impact formally. We introduce policy decay into a paradigmatic model of legislative policymaking and show that it leads to a starkly different perspective on legislative politics. Our results upend the classic notion of gridlock and bear implications more broadly for the practice of politics. We show how a changing world impacts the power of agenda control, how it drives the dynamic path of legislation, how it reveals a novel conception of policy expertise, and how it, ultimately, provides a foundational logic to the design of bureaucracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Callander & Gregory J. Martin, 2017. "Dynamic Policymaking with Decay," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(1), pages 50-67, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:1:p:50-67
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12258
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    Cited by:

    1. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Vohra, Akhil, 2023. "Losing money to make money: The benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 226-242.
    3. Andrews, Talbot M. & Delton, Andrew W. & Kline, Reuben, 2022. "Anticipating moral hazard undermines climate mitigation in an experimental geoengineering game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    4. William Howell & Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2020. "Political Conflict over Time," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(3), pages 554-568, July.
    5. Lee, Barton E., 2022. "Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    6. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.
    7. Gleason Judd & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2020. "Flexibility or Stability? Analyzing Proposals to Reform the Separation of Powers," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 309-324, April.

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