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Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach

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  • Michaela Mattes
  • Jessica L. P. Weeks

Abstract

An old adage holds that “only Nixon could go to China”; that is, hawkish leaders face fewer domestic barriers than doves when it comes to pursuing reconciliation with foreign enemies. However, empirical evidence for this proposition is mixed. In this article, we clarify competing theories, elucidate their implications for public opinion, and describe the results of a series of survey experiments designed to evaluate whether and why there is a hawk's advantage. We find that hawks are indeed better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement than doves. We also find support for two key causal mechanisms: Voters are more confident in rapprochement when it is pursued by a hawk and are more likely to view hawks who initiate conciliation as moderates. Further, the hawk's advantage persists whether conciliatory efforts end in success or failure. Our microfoundational evidence thus suggests a pronounced domestic advantage for hawks who deliver the olive branch.

Suggested Citation

  • Michaela Mattes & Jessica L. P. Weeks, 2019. "Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(1), pages 53-66, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:63:y:2019:i:1:p:53-66
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12392
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-197, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Abhijit Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard, 2021. "Does reducing inequality increase cooperation?​," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2021_022, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
    3. Egle Vaznyte & Petra Andries & Sarah Demeulemeester, 2021. "“Don’t leave me this way!” Drivers of parental hostility and employee spin-offs’ performance," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 265-293, June.
    4. Mu Han & Zhikun Yin & Pengzhou Cheng & Xing Zhang & Shidian Ma, 2020. "Zero-knowledge identity authentication for internet of vehicles: Improvement and application," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(9), pages 1-18, September.
    5. Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro’i, 2021. "Perceptions of conflict: Parochial cooperation and outgroup spite revisited," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 57-71.

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