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The Basic Arithmetic of Legislative Decisions

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  • Michael Laver
  • Kenneth Benoit

Abstract

Despite the huge number of possible seat distributions following a general election in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, there are far fewer classes of seat distribution sharing important strategic features. We define an exclusive and exhaustive partition of the universe of theoretically possible n‐party systems into five basic classes, the understanding of which facilitates more fruitful modeling of legislative politics, including government formation. Having defined a partition of legislative party systems and elaborated logical implications of this partition, we classify the population of postwar European legislatures. We show empirically that many of these are close to critical boundary conditions, so that stochastic processes involved in any legislative election could easily flip the resulting legislature from one type to another. This is of more than hypothetical interest, since we also show that important political outcomes differ systematically between the classes of party systems—outcomes that include duration of government formation negotiations, type of coalition cabinet that forms, and stability of the resulting government.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Laver & Kenneth Benoit, 2015. "The Basic Arithmetic of Legislative Decisions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(2), pages 275-291, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:2:p:275-291
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12111
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
    2. Thomas Fujiwara & Carlos Sanz, 2020. "Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(3), pages 1261-1295.
    3. Thomas Fujiwara & Carlos Sanz, 2017. "Norms in bargaining: evidence from government formation in Spain," Working Papers 1741, Banco de España.
    4. Artyom Jelnov & Pavel Jelnov, 2019. "Success, Survival and Probabilistic Voting: The Case of a ruling Party," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 209-226, December.

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