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Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats

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  • Taehee Whang
  • Elena V. McLean
  • Douglas W. Kuberski

Abstract

This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner's determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner's resolve. The second mechanism underscores the direct impact of common interest between the two countries and explains the success of sanction threats by the targeted country's greater dependence on this link between the two countries and the sanctioner's ability to exploit this dependence. We test the hypotheses using a new strategic structural estimator. Our results provide no evidence in favor of the informational hypothesis, while lending robust support for the coercive hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Taehee Whang & Elena V. McLean & Douglas W. Kuberski, 2013. "Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 65-81, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:57:y:2013:i:1:p:65-81
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00629.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Özge Korkmaz & Semih Karacan, 2024. "The Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War on the Bilateral Trade in the Region: Evidence from a Panel Gravity Model," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 59(3), pages 412-428, August.
    2. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy: A Survey," Working Papers 1072, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Ricardo Hausmann & Ulrich Schetter & Muhammed A Yildirim, 2024. "On the design of effective sanctions: the case of bans on exports to Russia," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 39(117), pages 109-153.
    4. Morgan, T. Clifton & Kobayashi, Yoshiharu, 2021. "Talking to the hand: Bargaining, strategic interaction, and economic sanctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    5. Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    6. Roel Dom & Lionel Roger, 2018. "Economic sanctions and domestic debt: Burundi's fiscal response to the suspension of budget support," Discussion Papers 2018-12, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    7. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    8. Yuleng Zeng, 2020. "Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 633-654, November.
    9. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2024. "Political economy of international sanctions," ILE Working Paper Series 81, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    10. Meyer, Klaus E. & Fang, Tony & Panibratov, Andrei Y. & Peng, Mike W. & Gaur, Ajai, 2023. "International business under sanctions," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 58(2).
    11. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    12. Menevis Cilizoglu & Navin A Bapat, 2020. "Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 385-408, July.
    13. Gustavo de Souza & Naiyuan Hu & Haishi Li & Yuan Mei, 2023. "(Trade) War and Peace: How to Impose International Trade Sanctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 10477, CESifo.
    14. T. Clifton Morgan & Navin Bapat & Yoshiharu Kobayashi, 2014. "Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(5), pages 541-558, November.
    15. Tomas Sjostrom, 2023. "Optimal Compellance," Departmental Working Papers 202302, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    16. Seitz, William & Presbitero, Andrea & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2017. "Sanctions and public opinion : the case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," IDE Discussion Papers 652, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    17. Demena, B.A. & Benalcazar Jativa, G. & Reta, A.S. & Kimararungu, P.B. & van Bergeijk, P.A.G., 2021. "Does research on economic sanctions suffer from publication bias?," ISS Working Papers - General Series 674, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    18. Yuying Jin & Xue Meng, 2024. "Interdependence and multilateral economic sanctions," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 983-1003, March.
    19. Elena V McLean & Jeheung Ryu & Taehee Whang, 2024. "The effect of economic coercion on companies’ foreign direct investment decisions: Evidence from sanctions against Russia," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(4), pages 438-462, July.
    20. Brekhov, Boris, 2019. "Economic Rewards versus Economic Sanctions in International Relations," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203599, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    21. Brandon J Kinne, 2014. "Does third-party trade reduce conflict? Credible signaling versus opportunity costs," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 28-48, February.
    22. Gustavo de Souza & Naiyuan Hu & Haishi Li & Yuan Mei, 2022. "(Trade) War and Peace: How to Impose International Trade Sanctions," Working Paper Series WP 2022-49, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    23. Elena V McLean & Kaisa H Hinkkainen & Luis De la Calle & Navin A Bapat, 2018. "Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(4), pages 378-401, July.

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