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Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments

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  • Laurel Harbridge
  • Neil Malhotra

Abstract

Does partisan conflict damage citizens’ perceptions of Congress? If so, why has polarization increased in Congress since the 1970s? To address these questions, we unpack the “electoral connection” by exploring the mass public's attitudes toward partisan conflict via two survey experiments in which we manipulated characteristics of members and Congress. We find that party conflict reduces confidence in Congress among citizens across the partisan spectrum. However, there exists heterogeneity by strength of party identification with respect to evaluations of members. Independents and weak partisans are more supportive of members who espouse a bipartisan image, whereas strong partisans are less supportive. People with strong attachments to a political party disavow conflict in the aggregate but approve of individual members behaving in a partisan manner. This pattern helps us understand why members in safely partisan districts engage in partisan conflict even though partisanship damages the collective reputation of the institution.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurel Harbridge & Neil Malhotra, 2011. "Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 494-510, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:55:y:2011:i:3:p:494-510
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00517.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2018. "Guns, Environment, and Abortion: How Single-Minded Voters Shape Politicians' Decisions," Working Papers wp459, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    2. Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2013. "Guns and Votes," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
      • Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2014. "Guns and Votes," NBER Working Papers 20253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2013. "Guns and votes," Working Papers 43819146, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
      • Zanardi, Maurizio & Conconi, Paola & Bouton, Laurent & Pino, Francisco, 2013. "Guns and Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 9726, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2021. "The Tyranny of the Single-Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 48-59, March.
    4. Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2014. "Social Ideology and Taxes in a Differentiated Candidates Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 308-322, January.
    5. Hollibaugh, Gary E. & Klingler, Jonathan & Ramey, Adam, 2014. "More than a Feeling: Personality and Congressional Behavior," IAST Working Papers 14-09, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    6. Schwarz, Marco A., 2017. "The Impact of Social Media On Belief Formation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 57, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    7. Marco Magnani, 2017. "Electoral competition with ideologically biased voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 415-439, July.
    8. Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 867-902, April.
    9. Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2012. "Elites or Masses? A Structural Model of Policy Divergence, Voter Sorting and Apparent Polarization in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1972-2008," CESifo Working Paper Series 3752, CESifo.
    10. Nikoleta Yordanova & Mariyana Angelova & Roni Lehrer & Moritz Osnabrügge & Sander Renes, 2020. "Swaying citizen support for EU membership: Evidence from a survey experiment of German voters," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 429-450, September.
    11. Clio Andris & David Lee & Marcus J Hamilton & Mauro Martino & Christian E Gunning & John Armistead Selden, 2015. "The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the U.S. House of Representatives," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, April.
    12. Qin, Meng & Su, Chi-Wei & Tao, Ran & Umar, Muhammad, 2020. "Is factionalism a push for gold price?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    13. Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2014. "Policy Divergence and Voter Polarization in a Structural Model of Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 31-76.

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