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Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict

Author

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  • David J. Lektzian
  • Christopher M. Sprecher

Abstract

Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy, described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary, or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals, the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs, there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. Democracies, because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs, while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender, are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • David J. Lektzian & Christopher M. Sprecher, 2007. "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(2), pages 415-431, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:51:y:2007:i:2:p:415-431
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00259.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Kimberly Ann Elliott & Tess Cyrus & Elizabeth Winston, 1997. "US Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages," Working Paper Series Working Paper Special (2), Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    2. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644150, September.
    3. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521643320, September.
    4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, April.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Renato Corbetta, 2015. "Between indifference and coercion: Third-party intervention techniques in ongoing disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(1), pages 3-27, February.
    4. Aysegul Aydin, 2010. "The deterrent effects of economic integration," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(5), pages 523-533, September.
    5. Rana Arslan Tariq, 2015. "Trade and Conflicts: Do Preferential Trade Agreements Matter?," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(4), pages 561-574, December.
    6. David Lektzian & Glen Biglaiser, 2014. "The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 70-93, February.
    7. Amanda Murdie & Dursun Peksen, 2013. "The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-53, March.
    8. Brandon J Kinne, 2014. "Does third-party trade reduce conflict? Credible signaling versus opportunity costs," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 28-48, February.
    9. Wonjae Hwang & Jeeseon Hwang, 2023. "Health aid for states with dissimilar foreign policy preferences, a tool for peace?," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 26(1), pages 55-70, March.
    10. Sajjad F Dizaji, 2024. "The impact of negative oil shocks on military spending and democracy in the oil states of the greater Middle East: Implications for the oil sanctions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 61(2), pages 197-213, March.
    11. Weber, Patrick M. & Schneider, Gerald, 2020. "How many hands to make sanctions work? Comparing EU and US sanctioning efforts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    12. Mirkina, Irina, 2018. "FDI and sanctions: An empirical analysis of short- and long-run effects," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 198-225.

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