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Banking Governance and Risk: The Case of Tunisian Conventional Banks

Author

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  • Rachdi Houssem

    (Faculty of Law, Economics and Management of Jendouba, University of Jendouba, Tunisia)

  • Trabelsi Mohamed Ali

    (High Business School of Tunis, University of Manouba, Tunisia)

  • Trad Naama

    (High Business School of Tunis, University of Manouba, Tunisia)

Abstract

Banks are in the business of taking risks. The 3 pillars of Basel II capital accord highlight the crucial role of informative risk disclosures in enhancing market discipline. The specific role and responsibilities of the board of directors or supervisory boards in banking institutions continue, however, to fuel debate. Findings of the literature are often inconclusive. The main contribution of this study is examining how board characteristics affect risk in banking industry. We explore this relationship by using many econometric approaches. The empirical analysis based on a sample of 11 Tunisian conventional banks over the period 2001-2011 reports the following results when using GLS RE: small and dual functions boards are associated with more insolvency risk but have no significant effect on credit and global risks. The presence of independent directors within the board generates an increase in global risk but has no significant effect on insolvency and credit risks. A lower CEO ownership has no significant effect with all measures of risks. Finally, banking capitalization is associated with more insolvency risk, and small size banks assume lower credit risk. These findings are performed by using a GMM in system approach

Suggested Citation

  • Rachdi Houssem & Trabelsi Mohamed Ali & Trad Naama, 2013. "Banking Governance and Risk: The Case of Tunisian Conventional Banks," Review of Economic Perspectives, Sciendo, vol. 13(4), pages 195-206, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:reoecp:v:13:y:2013:i:4:p:195-206:n:3
    DOI: 10.2478/revecp-2013-0009
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    Cited by:

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    2. Achraf Haddad, 2022. "Effect of board quality on the financial performance of conventional and Islamic banks: international comparative study after the Subprime crisis," Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 13(2), pages 399-449, June.
    3. Zulkufly Ramly & Nurusysyifa Nordin, 2018. "Sharia Supervision Board, Board Independence, Risk Committee and Risk-taking of Islamic Banks in Malaysia," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 8(4), pages 290-300.
    4. Diyan Lestari, 2018. "Corporate Governance, Capital Reserve, Non-Performing Loan, and Bank Risk Taking," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 8(2), pages 25-32.
    5. Khalfaoui Hamdi & Guenichi Hassen, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty effect on credit risk, lending decisions and banking performance: evidence from Tunisian listed banks," Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 38(2), pages 287-303, February.
    6. Zouhour Ben Hamadi & Hammami Yosra, 2016. "Expertise du CA, prise de risques et performance : Cas des banques tunisiennes," Post-Print hal-01901202, HAL.
    7. Simms Mensah Kyei & Nereida Polovina & Seyram Pearl Kumah, 2022. "The dynamic relationship between bank risk and corporate governance in Africa," Cogent Business & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 2124597-212, December.
    8. Marina Brogi & Valentina Lagasio, 2019. "Do bank boards matter? A literature review on the characteristics of banks' board of directors," International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 13(3), pages 244-274.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Board characteristics; Bank risk; Governance; GLS RE; GMM system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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