IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vrs/njopap/v13y2020i2p35-48n3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Top Officials’ Careers and the Relationship Between Politics and Administration

Author

Listed:
  • Bach Tobias

    (Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway)

Abstract

This essay elaborates how the analysis of administrative careers – both as dependent and independent variables – can be leveraged to gain a more systematic understanding of the relationship between politics and administration. It highlights how the analysis of administrative careers can provide answers to pertinent questions about the relationship between politics and administration, including civil service politicization, politicians’ motivations in patronage decisions, the interplay of organizational characteristics and top officials’ careers, and performance effects of administrative careers. It also includes suggestions on how to move forward in terms of research methods and how the systematic analysis of administrative careers can strengthen the comparative analysis of the relationship between politics and administration.

Suggested Citation

  • Bach Tobias, 2020. "Top Officials’ Careers and the Relationship Between Politics and Administration," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 13(2), pages 35-48, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:13:y:2020:i:2:p:35-48:n:3
    DOI: 10.2478/nispa-2020-0013
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2020-0013
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2478/nispa-2020-0013?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dahlström, Carl & Holmgren, Mikael, 2019. "The Political Dynamics of Bureaucratic Turnover," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 823-836, July.
    2. Adolph,Christopher, 2013. "Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107032613, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Pablo Paniagua, 2023. "Money and the rule of Law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 260-266, June.
    3. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R & Uribe-McGuire, Alicia, 2021. "Allies or Commitment Devices? A Model of Appointments to the Federal Reserve," SocArXiv b5zts, Center for Open Science.
    4. Stephanie L. Mudge & Antoine Vauchez, 2022. "Dependence on Independence. Central bank lawyers and the (un)making of the European economy," Post-Print hal-03913667, HAL.
    5. Fernando Filgueiras & Pedro Palotti & Graziella G. Testa, 2023. "Complexing Governance Styles: Connecting Politics and Policy in Governance Theories," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(1), pages 21582440231, March.
    6. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Mahieu, Ronald & Raes, Louis, 2018. "Inferring hawks and doves from voting records," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 107-120.
    7. Bodea, Cristina & Kerner, Andrew, 2022. "Fear of inflation and gender representation in central banking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    8. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Mahieu, Ronald & Raes, Louis, 2015. "Hawks and Doves at the FOMC," CEPR Discussion Papers 10442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Jäger, Kai, 2016. "The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 79-96.
    10. Emile van Ommeren & Giulia Piccillo, 2021. "The Central Bank Governor and Interest Rate Setting by Committee," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 67(2), pages 155-185.
    11. Ma, Ruichen & Pan, Xiaofei & Suardi, Sandy, 2024. "The quest for green horizons: Can political turnovers drive green investments? New evidence from China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    12. Leon Wansleben, 2021. "Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 909-932, July.
    13. Rounak Sil & Unninarayanan Kurup & Ashima Goyal & Apoorva Singh & Rajendra Narayan Paramanik, 2024. "Chorus in the Cacophony: Dissent and Policy Communication of India’s Monetary Policy Committee," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(18), pages 1900-1906, October.
    14. Kokoszczyński, Ryszard & Mackiewicz-Łyziak, Joanna, 2024. "Making monetary policy in Poland: Are Polish hawks and doves different?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    15. Lukas Spielberger, 2025. "No Longer Neutral: The ECB’s Geopoliticization of the International Role of the Euro," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 13.
    16. Broz, Lawrence, 2015. "The Federal Reserve as global lender of last resort, 2007-2010," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60951, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Diessner, Sebastian & Lisi, Giulio, 2019. "Masters of the ‘masters of the universe’? Monetary, fiscal and financial dominance in the Eurozone," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100754, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Gordon L. Clark, 2015. "The geography of the European Central Bank: form, functions and legitimacy," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(5), pages 855-881.
    19. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    20. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner & Alicia Uribe-McGuire, 2017. "Allies or commitment devices? A model of appointments to the Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 118-132, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:13:y:2020:i:2:p:35-48:n:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciendo.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.