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Is the Tragedy of the Commons Likely? Factors Preventing the Dissipation of Fuelwood Rents in Zimbabwe

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  • Richard L. Hegan
  • Grant Hauer
  • Martin K. Luckert

Abstract

Although village ‘‘rules’’ classify fuelwood resources in rural Zimbabwe as being open-access, theory suggests that social norms and/or heterogeneity among users prevents rents from being dissipated. Results from a Random Utility Model suggest that social norms and heterogeneous travel costs significantly influence site choice. Welfare measures suggest that there are positive site rents, and that these rents vary because social norms and/or heterogeneity are preventing rent dissipation at some sites more than others. Given the prevalence of social norms and heterogeneity in costs, the ‘‘tragedy-of-thecommons’’ is unlikely.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard L. Hegan & Grant Hauer & Martin K. Luckert, 2003. "Is the Tragedy of the Commons Likely? Factors Preventing the Dissipation of Fuelwood Rents in Zimbabwe," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(2), pages 181-197.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:79:y:2003:i:2:p:181-197
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Campbell, Bruce M. & Gordon, Iain J. & Luckert, Martin K. & Petheram, Lisa & Vetter, Susanne, 2006. "In search of optimal stocking regimes in semi-arid grazing lands: One size does not fit all," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 75-85, November.
    3. Mekonnen, Alemu & Bluffstone, Ramdall, 2008. "Is There a Link between Common Property Forest Management and Private Tree Growing? Evidence of Behavioral Effects from Highland Ethiopia," RFF Working Paper Series dp-08-29-efd, Resources for the Future.
    4. Bluffstone, Randy & Robinson, Elizabeth & Guthiga, Paul, 2013. "REDD+and community-controlled forests in low-income countries: Any hope for a linkage?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-52.
    5. Bluffstone, Randy & Robinson, Elizabeth & Guthiga, Paul, 2012. "Deforestation and forest degradation are estimated to account for between 12 percent and 20 percent of annual greenhouse gas emissions. These activities, largely in the developing world, released abou," RFF Working Paper Series dp-12-11-efd, Resources for the Future.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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