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Can Public Rankings Improve School Performance?: Evidence from a Nationwide Reform in Tanzania

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  • Jacobus Cilliers
  • Isaac M. Mbiti
  • Andrew Zeitlin

Abstract

In 2013, Tanzania introduced “Big Results Now in Education” (BRN), a low-stakes accountability program that published both nationwide and within-district school rankings. Using data from the universe of school performance for 2011–2016, we identify the impacts of the reform using a difference-in-differences estimator that exploits the differential pressure exerted on schools at the bottom of their respective district rankings. We find that BRN improved learning outcomes for schools in the bottom two deciles of their districts. However, the program also led schools to strategically exclude students from the terminal year of primary school.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacobus Cilliers & Isaac M. Mbiti & Andrew Zeitlin, 2021. "Can Public Rankings Improve School Performance?: Evidence from a Nationwide Reform in Tanzania," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(3), pages 655-685.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:56:y:2021:i:3:p:655-685
    Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.56.3.0119-9969R1
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    Cited by:

    1. Barrera-Osorio, Felipe & Cilliers, Jacobus & Cloutier, Marie-Hélène & Filmer, Deon, 2022. "Heterogenous teacher effects of two incentive schemes: Evidence from a low-income country," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    2. Borger, Michael & Elacqua, Gregory & Jacas, Isabel & Neilson, Christopher & Olsen, Anne Sofie Westh, 2024. "Report cards: Parental preferences, information and school choice in Haiti," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    3. Kasper Brandt & Beatrice K. Mkenda, 2020. "The Impact of Eliminating Secondary School Fees: Evidence from Tanzania," DERG working paper series 20-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Development Economics Research Group (DERG).
    4. Opalo, Ken Ochieng' & Habyarimana, James & Schipper, Youdi, 2021. "The Contingent Electoral Impacts of Programmatic Policies: Evidence From Education Reforms in Tanzania," OSF Preprints utpqn, Center for Open Science.
    5. Coelli, Michael & Foster, Gigi, 2024. "Unintended consequences of school accountability reforms: Public versus private schools," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    6. Roxana Elena Manea; Pedro Naso, 2021. "Heterogeneous Impacts of School Fee Elimination in Tanzania: Gender and Colonial Infrastructure," CIES Research Paper series 64-2020, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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