IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ush/jaessh/v3y2008i2(4)_summer200824.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On Insurance Contract Design For Low Probability Events

Author

Listed:
  • Eric LANGLAIS

Abstract

This paper extends the analysis of insurance contracts design to the case of "low probability events", when there is a probability mass on the "no accident-zero loss"-event. The optimality of the deductible clause is discussed both at the theoretical and empirical levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric LANGLAIS, 2008. "On Insurance Contract Design For Low Probability Events," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 3(2(4)_Summ).
    • Handle: RePEc:ush:jaessh:v:3:y:2008:i:2(4)_summer2008:24
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jaes.reprograph.ro/articles/Langlais.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cummins, J David & Mahul, Olivier, 2003. "Optimal Insurance with Divergent Beliefs about Insurer Total Default Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 121-138, October.
    2. Mehra, Rajnish & Prescott, Edward C., 1985. "The equity premium: A puzzle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 145-161, March.
    3. Olivier Mahul & Brian Davern Wright, 2004. "Implications of incomplete performance for optimal insurance," Post-Print hal-01952109, HAL.
    4. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 2000. "An axiomatic approach to choice under uncertainty with catastrophic risks," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 221-231, July.
    5. Christian Gollier & Harris Schlesinger, 1996. "Arrow's theorem on the optimality of deductibles: A stochastic dominance approach (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 359-363.
    6. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, 2004. "Neglecting Disaster: Why Don't People Insure Against Large Losses?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 5-21, January.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5463 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. John David Cummins & Olivier Mahul, 2003. "Optimal insurance with divergent beliefs about total default risk," Post-Print hal-01952121, HAL.
    9. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1990. "On tests of representative consumer asset pricing models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 285-304, October.
    10. Olivier Mahul, 1999. "The design of an optimal area yield crop insurance contract," Post-Print hal-01952091, HAL.
    11. G. Carlier & R.A. Dana & N. Shahidi, 2003. "Efficient Insurance Contracts under Epsilon-Contaminated Utilities," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 28(1), pages 59-71, June.
    12. Johnson, Eric J & Hershey, John & Meszaros, Jacqueline & Kunreuther, Howard, 1993. "Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 35-51, August.
    13. Eeckhoudt, L. & Gollier, C., 1996. "The Insurance of Low Probability Events," Papers 976.423, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    14. Mahul, Olivier, 2000. "Optimal insurance design with random initial wealth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 353-358, December.
    15. repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i:284:p:661-670 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Mark J. Machina, 1995. "Non-Expected Utility and The Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(1), pages 9-50, June.
    17. Raviv, Artur, 1979. "The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 84-96, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carole Bernard & Shaolin Ji & Weidong Tian, 2013. "An optimal insurance design problem under Knightian uncertainty," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 36(2), pages 99-124, November.
    2. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2018. "Welfare effects of insurance contract non-performance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(1), pages 39-76, May.
    3. Christian Gollier, 2014. "Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 555-576, November.
    4. Reichel, Lukas & Schmeiser, Hato & Schreiber, Florian, 2022. "On the optimal management of counterparty risk in reinsurance contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 374-394.
    5. Yohannes Kesete & Jiazhen Peng & Yang Gao & Xiaojun Shan & Rachel A. Davidson & Linda K. Nozick & Jamie Kruse, 2014. "Modeling Insurer‐Homeowner Interactions in Managing Natural Disaster Risk," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(6), pages 1040-1055, June.
    6. Boonen, Tim J. & Liu, Fangda, 2022. "Insurance with heterogeneous preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    7. Amarante, Massimiliano & Ghossoub, Mario & Phelps, Edmund, 2015. "Ambiguity on the insurer’s side: The demand for insurance," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 61-78.
    8. Christopher Gaffney & Adi Ben-Israel, 2016. "A simple insurance model: optimal coverage and deductible," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 237(1), pages 263-279, February.
    9. Andreas Richter & Jochen Ruß & Stefan Schelling, 2019. "Insurance customer behavior: Lessons from behavioral economics," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 183-205, July.
    10. Li, Yongwu & Xu, Zuo Quan, 2017. "Optimal insurance design with a bonus," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 111-118.
    11. Lu, Zhiyi & Meng, Shengwang & Liu, Leping & Han, Ziqi, 2018. "Optimal insurance design under background risk with dependence," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 15-28.
    12. Cohen Alma, 2006. "The Disadvantages of Aggregate Deductibles," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, April.
    13. Jiazhen Peng & Xiaojun Shan & Yang Gao & Yohannes Kesete & Rachel Davidson & Linda Nozick & Jamie Kruse, 2014. "Modeling the integrated roles of insurance and retrofit in managing natural disaster risk: a multi-stakeholder perspective," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 74(2), pages 1043-1068, November.
    14. Biener, Christian & Landmann, Andreas & Santana, Maria Isabel, 2019. "Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 65-83.
    15. Ghossoub, Mario, 2019. "Optimal insurance under rank-dependent expected utility," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 51-66.
    16. Markus Huggenberger & Peter Albrecht, 2022. "Risk pooling and solvency regulation: A policyholder's perspective," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(4), pages 907-950, December.
    17. Christopher Gaffney & Adi Ben-Israel, 2016. "A simple insurance model: optimal coverage and deductible," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 237(1), pages 263-279, February.
    18. Zuo Quan Xu, 2018. "Pareto optimal moral-hazard-free insurance contracts in behavioral finance framework," Papers 1803.02546, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    19. Chen Li & Xiaohu Li, 2018. "On the Optimal Risk Sharing in Reinsurance with Random Recovery Rate," Risks, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-16, October.
    20. Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-372, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal insurance design; low probability events.;

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ush:jaessh:v:3:y:2008:i:2(4)_summer2008:24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Laura Stefanescu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fmuspro.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.