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Systematic rent in global value chains

Author

Listed:
  • Ruslan A. Samsonov

    (Altai State University)

  • Sergey N. Bocharov

    (Altai State University)

Abstract

The theory of global value chains (GVCs) is one of the most extensive and promising theories in explaining the patterns and special features of the development of regional, national and international economies, which allows improving methods and models of strategic management of enterprises participating in GVCs. Based on the theory of systematic rent by Aleksey Gubar, we put forward a hypothesis suggesting that capital reproduction within GVCs is implemented through the system of economic mechanisms of rental relations. The proposed approach transcends the limitations of strategic management in the analysis of relational rents regarding the sources and mechanisms for forming dynamic competitive advantages of enterprises in the process of their interaction within value chains at different levels. The methodological framework includes theories of technological waves, rent and contracts, as well as the system-based approach to the analysis of qualitative and structural-dynamic characteristics of capital reproduction in GVCs. The research methods are economic modelling, statistical and graphical analysis. The study of processes and trends in capital reproduction within GVCs through the prism of the mechanism of systematic rent makes it possible to identify their patterns, peculiarities, forms and dynamics while concentrating on the major sources, stimuli and factors of development. We conclude that it is necessary to consider the systematic rent mechanism when framing business strategies and programs of state and regional development of the Russian economy within GVCs. At that, ignoring or misunderstanding rental economic mechanisms can cause serious errors in economic policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruslan A. Samsonov & Sergey N. Bocharov, 2019. "Systematic rent in global value chains," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 10(6), pages 2-14, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:url:upravl:v:10:y:2019:i:6:p:2-14
    DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2019-10-6-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. S. C. Littlechild, 2008. "Misleading Calculations of The Social Costs of Monopoly Power," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 89-104, Springer.
    2. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    3. Ruslan A. SAMSONOV & Sergey N. BOCHAROV, 2018. "Stakeholder Responsibility in the Formation of Global Value Chains," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 9(4), pages 53-65, August.
    4. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 347-347.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    global value chain; systematic rent; capital; economic mechanism; strategy; contract; dynamic competitive advantage.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • F6 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization

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