Estimation of tax administration system by taxpayer in the Ural federal district
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1996. "The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(1), pages 172-198, March.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Kalina Koleva, 2005. "Seeking for an optimal tax administration: the efficiency costs’ approach [A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience]," Post-Print halshs-00195354, HAL.
- Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Slemrod, Joel, 2004.
"The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness,"
National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 57(4), pages 877-899, December.
- Joel Slemrod, 2004. "The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness," NBER Working Papers 10858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lindsay Tedds, 2010.
"Keeping it off the books: an empirical investigation of firms that engage in tax evasion,"
Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(19), pages 2459-2473.
- Tedds, Lindsay, 2007. "Keeping it off the Books: An Empirical Investigation of Firms that Engage in Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 4213, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stéphane Gauthier, 2013.
"Optimal tax base with administrative fixed costs,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(6), pages 961-973, December.
- Stéphane Gauthier, 2011. "Optimal Tax Base with Administrative Fixed Costs," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11060, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Stéphane Gauthier, 2013. "Optimal Tax Base with Administrative Fixed Costs," Post-Print hal-00731095, HAL.
- Stéphane Gauthier, 2013. "Optimal Tax Base with Administrative Fixed Costs," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00731095, HAL.
- Stéphane Gauthier, 2011. "Optimal Tax Base with Administrative fixed Costs," Post-Print halshs-00639800, HAL.
- Stéphane Gauthier, 2013. "Optimal Tax Base with Administrative Fixed Costs," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00731095, HAL.
- Stéphane Gauthier, 2011. "Optimal Tax Base with Administrative fixed Costs," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00639800, HAL.
- Eleni A. Kaditi & Elisavet I. Nitsi, 2013. "Recent Evidence on the Taxpayers’ Reporting Decision in Greece: A Quantile Regression Approach," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(2), pages 3-24.
- Serra, Pablo, 2003.
"Measuring the Performance of Chile’s Tax Administration,"
National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 56(2), pages 373-383, June.
- Pablo Serra, 2000. "Measuring the Performance of Chile's Tax Administration," Documentos de Trabajo 77, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Duclos, Jean-Yves & Makdissi, Paul & Wodon, Quentin, 2005.
"Poverty-dominant program reforms: the role of targeting and allocation rules,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 53-73, June.
- Paul Makdissi & Quentin Wodon & Jean-Yves Duclos, 2002. "Poverty-dominant program reforms: the role of targeting and allocation rules," Cahiers de recherche 02-11, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke, revised 2004.
- Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002.
"Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470,
Elsevier.
- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Feldstein, Martin, 1997.
"How Big Should Government Be?,"
National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 50(2), pages 197-213, June.
- Martin Feldstein, 1996. "How Big Should Government Be?," NBER Working Papers 5868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Feldstein, Martin, 1997. "How Big Should Government Be?," Scholarly Articles 3043427, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Shun-ichiro Bessho & Masayoshi Hayashi, 2013.
"Estimating the Social Marginal Cost of Public Funds,"
Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(3), pages 360-385, May.
- HAYASHI Masayoshi & BESSHO Shun-ichiro, 2004. "Social marginal cost of public funds: A microdata estimation for the Japaneseprogressive income tax system (in Japanese)," ESRI Discussion paper series 113, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
- Shun-ichiro Bessho & Masayoshi Hayashi, 2011. "Estimating the Social Marginal Cost of Public Funds: A Micro-data Approach," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-817, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Shun-ichiro Bessho & Masayoshi Hayashi, 2005. "The Social Cost of Public Funds : The Case of Japanese Progressive Income Taxation," Finance Working Papers 22031, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Ellalee, Haider & Alali, Walid Y., 2022.
"A Welfare and Pass-Through Effects of Regulations within Imperfect Competition,"
MPRA Paper
116512, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alali, Walid Y & Ellalee, Haider, 2022. "A Welfare and Pass-Through Effects of Regulations within Imperfect Competition," EconStor Preprints 268756, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Chen, Shawn Xiaoguang, 2017.
"The effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement: Evidence from a natural experiment in China,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 62-76.
- Shawn Chen, 2015. "The Efect Of A Fiscal Squeeze On Tax Enforcement:Evidence From A Natural Experiment In China," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 15-27, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
- Austan Goolsbee, 2000.
"What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 352-378, April.
- Austan Goolsbee, 1997. "What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bumsoo Lee & Jiyoung Park & Peter Gordon & James E. Moore II & Harry W. Richardson, 2012. "Estimating the State-by-State Economic Impacts of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Attack," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 35(1), pages 26-47, January.
- Selén, Jan, 2002. "Taxable Income Responses to Tax Changes - A Panel Analysis of the 1990/91 Swedish Reform," Working Paper Series 177, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research.
- Zhiyong An, 2023. "On the marginal cost of public funds: the implications of charitable giving and warm glow," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 299-307, September.
- Dimitri Romanov, 2003. "Costs and Benefits of Marginal Reallocation of Tax Agency Resources in Pursuit of the Hard-to-Tax," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0323, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Sanz Labrador, Ismael & Sanz-Sanz, José Félix, 2013. "Política fiscal y crecimiento económico: consideraciones microeconómicas y relaciones macroeconómicas," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 5367, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Warlters, Michael, 2012.
"The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in Africa,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 58-72.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Walters, Michael, 2009. "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds and Tax Reform in Africa," TSE Working Papers 09-110, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
More about this item
Keywords
taxation; tax administration; state policy; tax effectiveness; tax administration attractiveness;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ura:ecregj:v:1:y:2012:i:4:p:173-178. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexey Naydenov (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.economyofregion.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.