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Privatización y fusiones en oligopolios mixtos

Author

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  • José Méndez Naya

Abstract

Partiendo de un modelo de oligopolio mixto en el que las empresas compiten a la Cournot, el objetivo de este trabajo es el de complementar la literatura existente sobre las fusiones horizontales de empresas. En concreto, se matiza la paradoja de las fusiones al probar que ciertas fusiones pueden ser beneficiosas para las empresas fusionadas, aunque no incluyan a la mayor parte de las empresas del mercado. Por otro lado, se demuestra que para que una fusión sea beneficiosa desde el punto de vista del bienestar es necesario que el grado de privatización de la empresa pública sea relativamente bajo.

Suggested Citation

  • José Méndez Naya, 2007. "Privatización y fusiones en oligopolios mixtos," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 34(1 Year 20), pages 37-52, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:34:y:2007:i:1:p:37-52
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Ruiz-Porras, 2010. "Privatización, competencia por depósito y desempeño bancarios," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 37(1 Year 20), pages 67-104, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatización; fusiones de oligopolios mixtos.;

    JEL classification:

    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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