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Modelo de planificación balanceado y modelo de asignación

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Oviedo
  • Ana Rubio Duca

Abstract

Baïou y Balinski (2002) generalizaron el modelo de asignación empresas-trabajadores a uno donde se planifica la asignación determinando además de la asignación de los trabajadores a las empresas cuánto tiempo los trabajadores le dedicarán a la empresa. Una planificación es estable si ningún par empresa-trabajador puede incrementar sus horas de trabajo juntos, perjudicando a algún agente menos deseable. Este artículo estudia la relación que existe entre este problema y un problema de matching y se muestra que cada planificación estable es equivalente a cierto matching estable.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Oviedo & Ana Rubio Duca, 2004. "Modelo de planificación balanceado y modelo de asignación," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 31(1 Year 20), pages 39-66, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:31:y:2004:i:1:p:39-66
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October.
    2. Mourad Baïou & Michel Balinski, 2002. "The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 485-503, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Modelo de Planificación; Planificación Estable; Modelo de Matching; Matching Estable.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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