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Stable systems of schedule contracts

Author

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  • Danilov, V.

    (Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

The paper studies the systems of paired contracts between agents of two complementary groups (workers and firms, students and universities, depositors and banks). Multiple contracts are allowed, as well as flexible contracts when the contract is concluded with some intensity. Agent preferences are described using choice functions. It is shown that if these choice functions satisfy the condition that we call conservativeness, then there are so-called stable systems of contracts, when it is unprofitable for any pair of counterparties to change the concluded contracts. The existence of a stable system of contracts is established using the transfinite process of sequential approximation, which generalizes the classical Gale?Shapley algorithm. As a result, we relieved of the finiteness conditions of the set of contracts. Such properties of stable systems as polarization and latticeness are also studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Danilov, V., 2021. "Stable systems of schedule contracts," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 51(3), pages 12-29.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2021:i:51:p:12-29
    DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2021-51-3-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vilmos Komornik & Zsolt Komornik & Christelle Viauroux, 2010. "Stable Schedule Matchings," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 10-120, UMBC Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2011.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vladimir I. Danilov, 2024. "Sequential choice functions and stability problems," Papers 2401.00748, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    choice function; Gale?Shapley algorithm; matching; lattice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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