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Fighting Over a Red Herring: The Role of Economics in Recreational-Commercial Allocation Disputes

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  • Joshua K. Abbott

Abstract

This article turns a critical eye on the current role of economics in informing inter-sector allocation disputes. I argue that much of this analysis relies on a notion of efficiency that is flawed on both static and dynamic grounds and fails to address the inefficiencies of existing management institutions. I propose that reallocation is rarely a first-order concern. Rather, it is a "red herring" that detracts from far more necessary fundamental reforms within the recreational sector. These reforms would significantly improve the accountability and efficiency of the sector and establish the necessary institutions to resolve allocation disputes in an adaptive, efficient manner through arms-length transactions. I propose a general framework for reform of mixed recreational-commercial fisheries and discuss realistic rights-based policies to better manage fishing mortality for private recreational anglers and facilitate transferability across sectors. I close with an appeal for more policy-relevant work on recreational fisheries by fisheries economists.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua K. Abbott, 2015. "Fighting Over a Red Herring: The Role of Economics in Recreational-Commercial Allocation Disputes," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 1-20.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:mresec:doi:10.1086/679464
    DOI: 10.1086/679464
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Borch, Trude, 2010. "Tangled lines in New Zealand's quota management system: The process of including recreational fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 655-662, May.
    2. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Timothy Fitzgerald & Kurt Schnier, 2013. "Nonregulatory Approaches to the Environment: Coasean and Pigouvian Perspectives," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(2), pages 238-258, July.
    3. Arnason, Ragnar, 2009. "Conflicting uses of marine resources: can ITQs promote an efficient solution?," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-30.
    4. Fenichel, Eli P. & Abbott, Joshua K., 2014. "Heterogeneity and the fragility of the first best: Putting the “micro” in bioeconomic models of recreational resources," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 351-369.
    5. Ragnar Arnason, 2009. "Conflicting uses of marine resources: can ITQs promote an efficient solution? ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 53(1), pages 145-174, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Hindsley & Craig E. Landry & Kurt Schnier & John C. Whitehead & Mohammadreza Zarei, 2021. "Joint Estimation of Revealed Preference Site Selection and Stated Preference Choice Experiment Recreation Data Considering Attribute NonAttendance," Working Papers 21-10, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.

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