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Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time

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  • Png, I P L

Abstract

How should a seller price capacity that has no salvage value to heterogeneous customers whose valuations are private information? There are two periods, and the seller cannot precommit to prices in the later period. One option is price discrimination: first price high, then discount later if excess capacity remains. By offering most-favored-customer protection, the seller can charge more in advance, but will leave capacity unsold with positive probability. The author favors the most-favored-customer protection when capacity is large and leans toward price discrimination when customers are more uncertain about the degree of excess demand in the first period. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Png, I P L, 1991. "Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1010-1028, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:99:y:1991:i:5:p:1010-28
    DOI: 10.1086/261787
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    Cited by:

    1. Tingliang Huang & Zhe Yin & Ying-Ju Chen, 2017. "Managing Posterior Price Matching: The Role of Customer Boundedly Rational Expectations," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 385-402, July.
    2. Kathryn E. Spier, 2003. "“Tied to the Mast”: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 91-120, January.
    3. Fiona Scott Morton, 1996. "The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid Most-Favored-Customer Rules," NBER Working Papers 5717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Xu, Frances Zhiyun, 2011. "Optimal best-price policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 628-643, September.
    5. H Zhang & H I Mesak, 2010. "Optimal multi-period service capacity allocation and pricing allowing for uncertain competitive entry," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 61(5), pages 780-789, May.
    6. Richard J. Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, 2000. "An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
    7. Tom S. Lee & I.P.L. Png, 2004. "Loss Leaders: An Indirect Empirical Test," Industrial Organization 0401008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Zhang, Ying & Zhang, Juliang, 2017. "Strategic customer behavior with disappointment aversion customers and two alleviation policies," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 170-177.
    9. Benjamin Marcus & Chris K. Anderson, 2006. "Online Low-Price Guarantees---A Real Options Analysis," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 54(6), pages 1041-1050, December.
    10. Mesak, Hani I. & Zhang, Hongkai & Pullis, Joe M., 2010. "On optimal service capacity allocation policy in an advance selling environment in continuous time," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(2), pages 505-512, June.
    11. Miquel Carreras-Simó, 2016. "Advanced sales and competition in a service industry," International Journal of Revenue Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 9(1), pages 1-16.
    12. Spier, Kathryn E., 2001. "The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation” Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7hm4d39g, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    13. Guoming Lai & Laurens G. Debo & Katia Sycara, 2010. "Buy Now and Match Later: Impact of Posterior Price Matching on Profit with Strategic Consumers," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 12(1), pages 33-55, December.
    14. Kenan Arifoğlu & Sarang Deo & Seyed M. R. Iravani, 2020. "Markdowns in Seasonal Conspicuous Goods," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(5), pages 1016-1029, September.
    15. Lee, Khai Sheang & Ng, Irene C. L., 2001. "Advanced sale of service capacities: a theoretical analysis of the impact of price sensitivity on pricing and capacity allocations," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 219-225, December.
    16. Baojun Jiang & K. Sudhir & Tianxin Zou, 2021. "Effects of Cost‐Information Transparency on Intertemporal Price Discrimination," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(2), pages 390-401, February.
    17. Mingyu Joo & Dinesh K. Gauri & Kenneth C. Wilbur, 2020. "Temporal Distance and Price Responsiveness: Empirical Investigation of the Cruise Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5362-5388, November.
    18. Zhan Pang & Wenqiang Xiao & Xuying Zhao, 2021. "Preorder Price Guarantee in e-Commerce," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(1), pages 123-138, 1-2.
    19. Lee Sang-Yong T. & Png Ivan P.L., 2004. "Buyer Shopping Costs and Retail Pricing: An Indirect Empirical Test," Review of Marketing Science, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-22, July.
    20. Klibanoff Peter & Kundu Tapas, 2010. "Monopoly Pricing under a Medicaid-Style Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Its Welfare Implication," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-43, August.
    21. Peng, Weicai & Tian, Zhongjun & Wang, Yefeng, 2020. "Price guarantee for advance selling in the presence of preorder-dependent social learning," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 115-122.
    22. Aviv, Yossi & Bazhanov, Andrei & Levin, Yuri & Nediak, Mikhail, 2016. "Quantity Competition under Resale Price Maintenance when Most Favored Customers are Strategic," MPRA Paper 72011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Cohen-Vernik, Dinah & Pazgal, Amit, 2017. "Price Adjustment Policy with Partial Refunds," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 93(4), pages 507-526.
    24. Cuihong Li & Fuqiang Zhang, 2013. "Advance Demand Information, Price Discrimination, and Preorder Strategies," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 57-71, September.
    25. Stephen Shum & Shilu Tong & Tingting Xiao, 2017. "On the Impact of Uncertain Cost Reduction When Selling to Strategic Customers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(3), pages 843-860, March.

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