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Welfare-Improving Asymmetric Information in Dynamic Insurance Markets

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  • Thomas de Garidel-Thoron

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  • Thomas de Garidel-Thoron, 2005. "Welfare-Improving Asymmetric Information in Dynamic Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 121-150, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:113:y:2005:i:1:p:121-150
    DOI: 10.1086/426039
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dionne, Georges & Doherty, Neil A, 1994. "Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 209-235, April.
    2. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    3. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-344, April.
    4. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
    5. I. Hendel & A. Lizzeri, 1999. "The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts:," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f6, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    6. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    7. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vitor Farinha Luz, 2022. "Optimal dynamic insurance contracts," Papers 2208.14560, arXiv.org.
    2. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
    3. Georges Dionne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Maki Dahchour, 2013. "Separating Moral Hazard From Adverse Selection And Learning In Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence From France," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 897-917, August.
    4. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    5. Neil A. Doherty & Christian Laux & Alexander Muermann, 2015. "Insuring Nonverifiable Losses," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 283-316.
    6. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Mimra, Wanda, 2023. "Adverse selection in insurance," Working Papers 23-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    7. Mouhamadou FALL & Anne LAVIGNE, 2006. "Multiperiod Health Insurance Contracts & Bayesian Updating of Beliefs," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 1263, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    8. Koch, Thomas G., 2014. "One pool to insure them all? Age, risk and the price(s) of medical insurance," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 1-11.
    9. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    10. de Pinto, Marco & Goerke, Laszlo & Palermo, Alberto, 2023. "On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 22-41.
    11. Martin Eling & Ruo Jia & Yi Yao, 2017. "Between-Group Adverse Selection: Evidence From Group Critical Illness Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(2), pages 771-809, June.
    12. Peng Shi & Wei Zhang, 2016. "A Test of Asymmetric Learning in Competitive Insurance With Partial Information Sharing," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(3), pages 557-578, September.
    13. Renee B. Kim, 2012. "Consumers' perceptions of food risk management quality: Chinese and Korean evaluations," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 58(1), pages 10-20.
    14. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.

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