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Economic Efficiency, Nuisance, and Sewage: New Lessons from Attorney-General v. Council of the Borough of Birmingham, 1858–95

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  • Leslie Rosenthal

Abstract

This paper examines the postlitigation history of an English nuisance case of 1858 concerning pollution of the river Tame caused by sewage from the city of Birmingham. This case is a classic citation that purports to illustrate the absence in English nuisance law of a social benefit defense for nuisance. As the court’s judgment in law found in favor of an individual landowner against Birmingham, population 250,000, property rights were manifestly awarded where benefits were lower. Coase’s theorem arguments would expect that postlitigation negotiations would ensue, and in this case such negotiations did occur but broke down. The legal conflict stretched on over nearly 40 years, while the pollution was, in practice, allowed to continue. The argument is made that the English court, in effect, by failing to enforce its decisions robustly, did take note of the calamitous social effects that would have followed a rigorous enforcement of the court’s orders.

Suggested Citation

  • Leslie Rosenthal, 2007. "Economic Efficiency, Nuisance, and Sewage: New Lessons from Attorney-General v. Council of the Borough of Birmingham, 1858–95," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 27-62, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:27-62
    DOI: 10.1086/508268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
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    4. Deirdre N. McCloskey, 1998. "Other Things Equal: The So-Called Coase Theorem," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 367-371, Summer.
    5. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1980. "Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies," NBER Working Papers 0463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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