The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1086/421574
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring.
- Harris, Milton & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1987. "On the Duration of Agreements," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 389-406, June.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1996.
"Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 191-210, April.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1993. "Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages," NBER Working Papers 4287, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schwartz, Alan, 1992. "Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 271-318, June.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
- Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June.
- Jolls, Christine, 1997. "Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 203-237, January.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1996. "A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Steven Shavell, 2007. "Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 325-354, June.
- Steven Shavell, 2005. "Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention," NBER Working Papers 11284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Uri Weiss, 2015. "The Robber Wants To Be Punished," Discussion Paper Series dp685, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Miceli, Thomas J., 2002. ""Over a barrel": contract modification, reliance, and bankruptcy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 41-51, July.
- Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2009.
"Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2193-2208, December.
- Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2004. "Endogenous Verifiability in Relational Contracting," Discussion Papers 2004/20, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Matthew Ellman, 2006. "The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing," Economics Working Papers 965, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2007.
"Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 627-656, December.
- Bruno Deffains & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2005. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Post-Print hal-00279241, HAL.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Working Papers of BETA 2006-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-071/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006.
"Construction Contracts (or “How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?”),"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1714, CESifo.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Construction Contracts (or: "How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?")," IZA Discussion Papers 2125, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999.
"From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions,"
Post-Print
halshs-03704424, HAL.
- Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2008. "From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions," MPRA Paper 37887, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2002.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j99008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2011.
"Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance,"
Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 18, pages 1591-1696,
Elsevier.
- MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2010. "Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 5357, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2010. "Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance," NBER Working Papers 16048, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sergei Guriev & Mikhail Klimenko, 2015.
"Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 1818-1849, December.
- Sergei Guriev & Mikhail Klimenko, 2010. "Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements," Working Papers w0150, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Sergei Guriev & Mikhail Klimenko, 2015. "Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements," Post-Print hal-03392962, HAL.
- Sergei Guriev & Mikhail Klimenko, 2010. "Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements," Working Papers w0150, New Economic School (NES).
- Sergei Guriev & Mikhail Klimenko, 2015. "Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03392962, HAL.
- Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Saraceno, Margherita, 2020. "Fee shifting and accuracy in adjudication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Gabriel Jobidon & Pierre Lemieux & Robert Beauregard, 2019. "Comparison of Quebec’s Project Delivery Methods: Relational Contract Law and Differences in Contractual Language," Laws, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-75, April.
- Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Contract Law," NBER Working Papers 9696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005.
"Contracting on Time,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1369-1385, December.
- Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," Working Papers w0059, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," Working Papers w0059, New Economic School (NES).
- Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," Post-Print hal-03459064, HAL.
- Kyoungwon Rhee, 2007. "The Value of Contracting with the Sequential Investments: The Role of Outside Values," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 23, pages 89-110.
- Simon Schropp, 2007. "Revisiting the "Compliance-vs.-Rebalancing" Debate in WTO Scholarship a Unified Research Agenda," IHEID Working Papers 29-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Dec 2007.
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "A reputation for being a nuisance: frivolous lawsuits and fee shifting in a repeated play game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 147-157, June.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005.
"Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 26/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1998. "Negative Expected Value Suits," NBER Working Papers 6474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Simon Schropp, Kornel Mahlstein, 2007. "The Optimal Design of Trade Policy Flexibility in the WTO," IHEID Working Papers 27-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Dec 2007.
- Chaserant, Camille, 2007.
"Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 227-253, juin.
- Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude. Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01297143, HAL.
- Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude. Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," Post-Print halshs-01297143, HAL.
- Stéphane Saussier, 1998. "La durée des contrats interentreprises : une analyse empirique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 135(4), pages 137-146.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:33:y:2004:p:391-430. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.