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Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle

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  • Stanley, Linda R
  • Coursey, Don L

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Suggested Citation

  • Stanley, Linda R & Coursey, Don L, 1990. "Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 145-172, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:145-72
    DOI: 10.1086/467845
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    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2010. "Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining," Discussion Papers 10-28, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    2. McBride, Michael & Skaperdas, Stergios & Tsai, Pi-Han, 2018. "Why go to court? Bargaining failure under the shadow of trial with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 151-168.
    3. Cary Deck & Paul Pecorino & Michael Solomon, 2024. "Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 244-278, June.
    4. Marco, Alan C., 2005. "Learning by Suing: Structural Estimates of Court Errors in Patent Litigation," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 68, Vassar College Department of Economics.
    5. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00746617 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Emotions in litigation contests," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 195-215, September.
    7. Main, Brian G. M. & Park, Andrew, 2002. "The impact of defendant offers into court on negotiation in the shadow of the law: experimental evidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 177-192, August.
    8. Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark, 2014. "Bargaining with Asymmetric Dispute Costs," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 31-58, March.
    9. Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "Analyse économique du droit et méthode expérimentale," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00746617, HAL.
    10. Brian G Main & Andrew Park, 1999. "The British American Rules: An experimental examination of pre-trial bargaining within the shadow of the law," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 30, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    11. Farmer, Amy & Tiefenthaler, Jill, 2001. "Conflict in divorce disputes: the determinants of pretrial settlement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 157-180, June.
    12. Anderson, Terry L & McChesney, Fred S, 1994. "Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 39-74, April.
    13. Terza, Joseph V. & Tsai, Wei-Der, 2006. "Censored Probit Estimation with Correlation near the Boundary: A Useful Reparameteriztion," Review of Applied Economics, Lincoln University, Department of Financial and Business Systems, vol. 2(1), pages 1-12.
    14. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2001. "FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2001-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    15. Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark, 2015. "Costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 16-28.

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