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The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking

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  • Anat R. Admati

Abstract

Excessive leverage (indebtedness) in banking endangers the public and distorts the economy. Yet current and proposed regulations only tweak previous regulations that failed to provide financial stability. This paper discusses the forces that have led to this situation, some of which appear to be misunderstood. The benefits to society of requiring that financial institutions use significantly more equity funding than the status quo are large, while any costs are entirely private because of banks' ability to shift some of their costs to others when they use debt. Without quantitative analysis, I outline improved regulations and how they can be implemented.

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  • Anat R. Admati, 2014. "The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 35-61.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/677557
    DOI: 10.1086/677557
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    9. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2013. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Michael B. Imerman, 0. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-36.
    3. David Martinez-Miera & Rafael Repullo, 2018. "Markets, Banks, and Shadow Banks," Working Papers wp2018_1811, CEMFI.
    4. Partha Mohanram & Sasan Saiy & Dushyantkumar Vyas, 2018. "Fundamental analysis of banks: the use of financial statement information to screen winners from losers," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 200-233, March.
    5. Louhichi, Awatef & Louati, Salma & Boujelbene, Younes, 2020. "The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    6. Koresh Galil & Margalit Samuel & Offer Moshe Shapir & Wolf Wagner, 2023. "Bailouts and the modeling of bank distress," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 7-30, February.
    7. Temimi, Akram & Zeitun, Rami & Mimouni, Karim, 2016. "How does the tax status of a country impact capital structure? Evidence from the GCC region," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 37, pages 71-89.
    8. Shabir, Mohsin & Jiang, Ping & Bakhsh, Satar & Zhao, Zhongxiu, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty and bank stability: Threshold effect of institutional quality and competition," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    9. Joseph Haslag, 2019. "On Processing Central Bank Communications: Can We Account for Fed Watching?," 2019 Meeting Papers 415, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 2014. "Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 1-34.
    11. Pavel Kapinos & Oscar A. Mitnik, 2016. "A Top-down Approach to Stress-testing Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 229-264, June.
    12. Michael B. Imerman, 2020. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 1371-1406, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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