IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/doi10.1086-675771.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Futility of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Disclosure Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Omri Ben-Shahar
  • Carl E. Schneider

Abstract

What would happen if cost-benefit analysis (CBA) were applied to disclosure regulations? Mandated disclosure has largely escaped rigorous CBA because it looks so plausible: disclosure seems rich in benefits and low in cost. This article makes two arguments. First, it previews our thesis in More Than You Wanted to Know that disclosure laws do not deliver their anticipated benefits and thus cannot easily pass quantified CBA. Second, it describes a previously unrecognized cost of disclosure, one arising from lawmakers' collective-action problem. With the proliferation of disclosures, each new mandate diminishes the attention that people can give to other information, including all other disclosures. The problem for CBA is lawmakers' inability to coordinate laws across different fields and jurisdictions. This article illustrates this regulatory failure by examining the rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for its recent mortgage disclosure regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, 2014. "The Futility of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Disclosure Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 253-271.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/675771
    DOI: 10.1086/675771
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/675771
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/675771
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/675771?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Beshears & James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, 2011. "How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals' Mutual Fund Choices?," NBER Chapters, in: Explorations in the Economics of Aging, pages 75-96, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lee, Jinkook & Hogarth, Jeanne M., 2000. "Consumer information search for home mortgages: who, what, how much, and what else?," Financial Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 277-293, 00.
    3. Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, 2003. "The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(2), pages 409-451.
    4. Durkin, Thomas A. & Elliehausen, Gregory, 2011. "Truth in Lending: Theory, History, and a Way Forward," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195172959.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Y. Svetiev & E. Dermineur & U. Kolanisi, 2022. "Financialization and Sustainable Credit: Lessons from Non-Intermediated Transactions?," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 45(4), pages 673-698, December.
    2. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 2014. "Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 1-34.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Grubb, 2015. "Failing to Choose the Best Price: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(3), pages 303-340, November.
    2. Enrique Seira & Alan Elizondo & Eduardo Laguna-Müggenburg, 2017. "Are Information Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 277-307, February.
    3. Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato & John A. List, 2010. "That’S News To Me! Information Revelation In Professional Certification Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 104-122, January.
    4. Villas-Boas, Sofia B, 2020. "Reduced Form Evidence on Belief Updating Under Asymmetric Information," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt08c456vk, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    5. Susan Feng Lu, 2012. "Multitasking, Information Disclosure, and Product Quality: Evidence from Nursing Homes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 673-705, September.
    6. Tahir Andrabi & Jishnu Das & Asim Ijaz Khwaja, 2017. "Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1535-1563, June.
    7. David W. Lehman & Balázs Kovács & Glenn R. Carroll, 2014. "Conflicting Social Codes and Organizations: Hygiene and Authenticity in Consumer Evaluations of Restaurants," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(10), pages 2602-2617, October.
    8. Felipe Arteaga & Adam J Kapor & Christopher A Neilson & Seth D Zimmerman, 2022. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1791-1848.
    9. Hallstein, Eric & Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto, 2009. "Are Consumers Color Blind?: an empirical investigation of a traffic light advisory for sustainable seafood," CUDARE Working Papers 120535, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    10. Laurent Bouton, 2011. "Good rankings are bad - Why reliable rankings can hurt consumers," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    11. Rolf Uwe Fülbier & Thorsten Sellhorn, 2023. "Understanding and improving the language of business: How accounting and corporate reporting research can better serve business and society," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(6), pages 1089-1124, August.
    12. Seth Freedman & Melissa Kearney & Mara Lederman, 2012. "Product Recalls, Imperfect Information, and Spillover Effects: Lessons from the Consumer Response to the 2007 Toy Recalls," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(2), pages 499-516, May.
    13. Chen, Simiao & Jin, Zhangfeng & Bloom, David E., 2020. "Act Early to Prevent Infections and Save Lives: Causal Impact of Diagnostic Efficiency on the COVID-19 Pandemic," IZA Discussion Papers 13749, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Samuel Bazzi & Lisa Cameron & Simone Schaner & Firman Witoelar, 2021. "Information, Intermediaries, and International Migration," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2021n30, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    15. Eduardo Fajnzylber & Gonzalo Reyes, 2015. "Knowledge, Information, and Retirement Saving Decisions: Evidence from a Large-Scale Intervention in Chile," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 83-117, February.
    16. Wong, Woei Chyuan & Batten, Jonathan A. & Ahmad, Abd Halim & Mohamed-Arshad, Shamsul Bahrain & Nordin, Sabariah & Adzis, Azira Abdul, 2021. "Does ESG certification add firm value?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(C).
    17. Belay, Dagim G. & Jensen, Jørgen D., 2020. "‘The scarlet letters’: Information disclosure and self-regulation: Evidence from antibiotic use in Denmark," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    18. Makofske, Matthew Philip, 2020. "Disclosure policies in inspection programs: The role of specific deterrence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    19. J. Collins, 2011. "Mortgage Mistakes? Demographic Factors Associated with Problematic Loan Application Behaviors," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 586-599, December.
    20. Mérel, Pierre & Ortiz-Bobea, Ariel & Paroissien, Emmanuel, 2021. "How big is the “lemons” problem? Historical evidence from French wines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/675771. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.