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Lethal Elections: Gubernatorial Politics and the Timing of Executions

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  • Kubik, Jeffrey D
  • Moran, John R

Abstract

We document the existence of a gubernatorial election cycle in state executions, which suggests that election-year political considerations play a role in determining the timing of executions. Our analysis indicates that states are approximately 25 percent more likely to conduct executions in gubernatorial election years than in other years. We also find that elections have a larger effect on the probability that an African-American defendant will be executed in a given year than on the probability that a white defendant will be executed and that the overall effect of elections is largest in the South.

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  • Kubik, Jeffrey D & Moran, John R, 2003. "Lethal Elections: Gubernatorial Politics and the Timing of Executions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-25, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2003:v:46:i:1:p:1-25
    DOI: 10.1086/374705
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    1. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    2. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
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    5. Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, 2001. "Can Policy Changes Be Treated as Natural Experiments? Evidence from State Excise Taxes," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 39, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Spyros Skouras & Nicos Christodoulakis, 2014. "Electoral misgovernance cycles: evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in Greece," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 533-559, June.
    3. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2009. "Direkte Demokratie und Menschenrechte," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2009 2009-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    4. Hanson, Andrew, 2009. "Local employment, poverty, and property value effects of geographically-targeted tax incentives: An instrumental variables approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 721-731, November.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2004:i:2:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Pi-Han Tsai, 2014. "State Fiscal Rules and Composition Changes in Public Spending before the Election," Public Finance Review, , vol. 42(1), pages 58-91, January.
    7. Spyros Skouras & Nicos Christodoulakis, 2011. "Electoral Misgovernance Cycles: Evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in Greece and elsewhere," GreeSE – Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 47, Hellenic Observatory, LSE.
    8. Radha Iyengar, 2011. "Who's the Fairest in the Land? Analysis of Judge and Jury Death Penalty Decisions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 693-722.
    9. James M. Poterba, 2005. "Steven D. Levitt: 2003 John Bates Clark Medalist," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 181-198, Summer.
    10. De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny & Schönhage, Nanna Lauritz, 2018. "Strategic public policy around population thresholds," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 46-58.
    11. Andrew Hanson & Shawn Rohlin, 2011. "The Effect of Location-Based Tax Incentives on Establishment Location and Employment across Industry Sectors," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(2), pages 195-225, March.
    12. Bernd Süssmuth, 2004. "A note on death penalty executions and business cycles in U.S. federal states: Is there any nexus?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-9.

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