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How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film Contracts

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  • Kenney, Roy W
  • Klein, Benjamin

Abstract

This paper uses the block-booking film exhibition contracts that were the subject of Paramount to examine the role of contract terms in facilitating self-enforcing relationships. Because of the large uncertainty in film value at the time of contracting, it is difficult to fully specify optimal exhibitor performance (such as exhibition run length) ex ante. Instead, the efficient contractual arrangement contractually overconstrains exhibitors and relies on the superior reputational capital of distributors to flexibly adjust contract terms ex post. The analysis illustrates that, rather than thinking of contracts as either court-enforced or self-enforced, transactors generally combine court-enforced and self-enforced sanctions by using contract terms to economize on their limited reputational capital. Block booking is explained within this framework by its effects on reducing the variance in the value of the film package and, therefore, the demands placed on the distributors' reputational capital. Copyright 2000 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenney, Roy W & Klein, Benjamin, 2000. "How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 427-435, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:43:y:2000:i:2:p:427-35
    DOI: 10.1086/467461
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 444-463, July.
    2. Hanssen, F Andrew, 2000. "The Block Booking of Films Reexamined," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 395-426, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ricard Gil & Wesley Hartmann, 2007. "The Role and Determinants of Concession Sales in Movie Theaters: Evidence from the Spanish Exhibition Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 30(4), pages 325-347, June.
    2. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2012. "Bundling and Competition for Slots," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1957-1985, August.
    3. Moul, Charles C., 2008. "Retailer entry conditions and wholesaler conduct: The theatrical distribution of motion pictures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 966-983, July.
    4. Fabrice Lumineau & Bertrand Quélin, 2012. "An empirical investigation of interorganizational opportunism and contracting mechanisms," Post-Print hal-00668599, HAL.
    5. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2010. "Vertical Integration during the Hollywood Studio Era," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(3), pages 519-543.
    6. Darlene C Chisholm, 2011. "Motion Pictures," Chapters, in: Ruth Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 39, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Elisabetta Iossa & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2008. "Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B," EIEF Working Papers Series 1022, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Dec 2010.
    8. Orbach, Barak Y. & Einav, Liran, 2007. "Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 129-153.

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