Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to Contribution?
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DOI: 10.1086/684987
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- Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, 2015. "Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to Contribution?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 16, pages 89-133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, 2015. "Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to Contribution?," NBER Working Papers 21678, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution," NBER Working Papers 13141, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt1qm754rc, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008.
"How Strong Are Weak Patents?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-1369, September.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt8vg425vj, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Brian J Love & Yassine Lefouili & Christian Helmers, 2023.
"Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence From U.S. District Court Dockets,"
American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 300-337.
- Love, Brian & Lefouili, Yassine & Helmers, Christian, 2020. "Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets," TSE Working Papers 20-1160, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Brian Love & Yassine Lefouili & Christian Helmers, 2023. "Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets," Post-Print hal-04547832, HAL.
- Steven Berry & Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, 2019.
"Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 44-68, Summer.
- Steven T. Berry & Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, 2019. "Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization," NBER Working Papers 26007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ajay Agrawal & Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2019.
"Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence,"
Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 139-159.
- Ajay Agrawal & Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018. "Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 19, pages 139-159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ajay K. Agrawal & Joshua S. Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018. "Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence," NBER Working Papers 24690, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Avi Goldfarb & Joshua Gans & Ajay Agrawal, 2018. "Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence," Working Papers id:12798, eSocialSciences.
- Ajay K. Agrawal & Joshua S. Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018. "Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence," Working Papers id:12823, eSocialSciences.
- Love, Brian J. & Helmers, Christian, 2023. "Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
- Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, 2022. "Antitrust Limits on Patent Settlements: A New Approach," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 257-293, June.
- Margaret K. Kyle, 2019. "The Alignment of Innovation Policy and Social Welfare: Evidence from Pharmaceuticals," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 20, pages 95-123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Galetovic, Alexander & Haber, Stephen & Zaretzki, Lew, 2018. "An estimate of the average cumulative royalty yield in the world mobile phone industry: Theory, measurement and results," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 263-276.
- Nancy Gallini, 2017.
"Do patents work? Thickets, trolls and antibiotic resistance,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(4), pages 893-926, November.
- Nancy Gallini, 2017. "Do patents work? Thickets, trolls and antibiotic resistance," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(4), pages 893-926, November.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2021. "Patent assertion entities and the courts: Injunctive or fee-based relief?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
- Gianluca Orsatti & Valerio Sterzi, 2018. "Do Patent Assertion Entities Harm Innovation? Evidence from Patent Transfers in Europe," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2018-08, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
- Valerio STERZI & Jean-Paul RAMESHKOUMAR & Johannes VAN DER POL, 2020. "Non-practicing entities and transparency in patent ownership in Europe," Bordeaux Economics Working Papers 2020-10, Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE).
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JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
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