IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/the/publsh/5694.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions

Author

Listed:
  • Dilme, Francesc

    (Department of Economics, University of Bonn)

Abstract

This paper studies repeated bargaining with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's previous purchases and sets a price. We compare the cases where previous prices are observable to sellers with the case where they are not. We show that more signal precision is counterbalanced by two equilibrium mechanisms that slow learning and keep incentives in balance: (1) sellers offer discounted prices more often, and (2) the buyer rejects high prices with a higher probability. The effect of making prices observable depends on the signal precision: When the signal is imprecise, making prices public strengthens the discounting mechanism, improving efficiency and buyer welfare; when the signal is precise, making prices public activates the rejection mechanism, and efficiency and buyer welfare may decrease. Independently of the price observability, the buyer tends to benefit from a more precise signal about previous purchases.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilme, Francesc, 0. "Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:5694
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/5694/39945/1
    File Function: Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Garrett A. Johnson & Scott K. Shriver & Shaoyin Du, 2020. "Consumer Privacy Choice in Online Advertising: Who Opts Out and at What Cost to Industry?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(1), pages 33-51, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chongwoo Choe & Noriaki Matsushima & Shiva Shekhar, 2023. "The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management," CESifo Working Paper Series 10617, CESifo.
    2. Xiaowei Mei & Hsing Kenneth Cheng & Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay & Liangfei Qiu & Lai Wei, 2022. "Sponsored Data: Smarter Data Pricing with Incomplete Information," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(1), pages 362-382, March.
    3. Luis Aguiar & Christian Peukert & Maximilian Schäfer & Hannes Ullrich, 2022. "Facebook Shadow Profiles," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1998, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio & Ying Lei Toh, 2024. "Privacy Regulation and Quality‐Enhancing Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 662-684, June.
    5. Avi Goldfarb & Ginger Jin & K. Sudhir, 2020. "Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(1), pages 1-4, January.
    6. David A. Schweidel & Yakov Bart & J. Jeffrey Inman & Andrew T. Stephen & Barak Libai & Michelle Andrews & Ana Babić Rosario & Inyoung Chae & Zoey Chen & Daniella Kupor & Chiara Longoni & Felipe Thomaz, 2022. "How consumer digital signals are reshaping the customer journey," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 50(6), pages 1257-1276, November.
    7. Haifei Yu & Shanshan Zheng & Hao Wu, 2023. "User Privacy Awareness, Incentive and Data Supply Chain Pricing Strategy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-24, February.
    8. Guy Aridor & Yeon-Koo Che & Tobias Salz, 2020. "The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR," NBER Working Papers 26900, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Anna D’Annunzio & Antonio Russo, 2024. "Intermediaries in the Online Advertising Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(1), pages 33-53, January.
    10. Miller, Klaus M. & Skiera, Bernd, 2024. "Economic consequences of online tracking restrictions: Evidence from cookies," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 241-264.
    11. Lorien Sabatino & Geza Sapi, 2023. "Privacy regulation and online concentration during demand peaks: evidence from the E-commerce sector," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 50(2), pages 265-282, June.
    12. Mateusz Mysliwski & Lars Nesheim & Simeon Duckworth, 2023. "Taking the biscuit: how Safari privacy policies affect online advertising," CeMMAP working papers 04/23, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    13. Guy Aridor & Yeon‐Koo Che & Tobias Salz, 2023. "The effect of privacy regulation on the data industry: empirical evidence from GDPR," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 695-730, December.
    14. Tesary Lin, 2022. "Valuing Intrinsic and Instrumental Preferences for Privacy," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 663-681, July.
    15. Teck Ming Tan & Saila Saraniemi, 2023. "Trust in blockchain-enabled exchanges: Future directions in blockchain marketing," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 914-939, July.
    16. Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio & Ying Lei Toh, 2024. "Privacy Regulation and Quality‐Enhancing Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 662-684, June.
    17. Ratul Das Chaudhury & Chongwoo Choe, 2023. "Digital Privacy: GDPR and Its Lessons for Australia," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 56(2), pages 204-220, June.
    18. Jeffrey T. Prince & Scott Wallsten, 2022. "How much is privacy worth around the world and across platforms?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 841-861, November.
    19. Garrett Johnson & Julian Runge & Eric Seufert, 2022. "Privacy-Centric Digital Advertising: Implications for Research," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 9(1), pages 49-54, June.
    20. Min Tian & Paul R. Hoban & Neeraj Arora, 2024. "What Cookie-Based Advertising Effectiveness Fails to Measure," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(2), pages 407-418, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated trade; asymmetric information; internet cookies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:the:publsh:5694. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Martin J. Osborne (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://econtheory.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.